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The Text, the Whole Text, and Nothing but
the Text, So Help Me God: Un-Writing Amar's
Unwritten Constitution
Michael Stokes Paulsent

America's Unwritten Constitution: The Precedentsand
PrinciplesWe Live By
Akhil Reed Amar. Basic Books, 2012. 615 pages.
INTRODUCTION

No, no, no! America has no "unwritten constitution'" Ours is
a system of written constitutionalism. There are only sound conclusions and inferences-or unsound ones-from the text itself.
The text-the whole text, of course, including the relationships and interactions among differing provisions, the structures
of government it creates, the logic of its arrangements, and the
inferences that fairly can be drawn from its provisions-is the
sole object of constitutional interpretation. The text of course
must be understood in terms of the original public meaning of
its words and phrases, in the linguistic, social, and political contexts in which they were written: history and context illuminate
textual meaning; so does constitutional structure; so can precedent, at least sometimes. But ultimately, it is the objective
meaning of the words of the written constitutional text that is
t Distinguished University Chair and Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas
School of Law. My thanks to Gary Lawson, Larry Solum, and Sherif Girgis for comments
on fragments of early drafts. (Do not blame them for what I say.)
Akhil Amar is an old and dear friend. We were roommates and constitutional law
sparring partners as students at Yale Law School in the early 1980s. We disagreed wildly
and occasionally vehemently-yet somehow still cheerfully-over many things. We continue to disagree over a great many things today-including (as this review demonstrates) nearly everything in his recent book. As noted below, I have reviewed two of
Akhil's other books highly favorably. See note 3. I hope he will forgive me this unfavorablebut still cheerful-review, which I offer in the same spirit as our dorm-room screaming
matches thirty years ago. (You told me I could let you have it, if I thought you deserved
it, Akhil. Well, here it is!)
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the whole ball game. If what one is doing is interpreting and
applying the Constitution as authoritative written law-as opposed to engaging in some other interesting project-then one
looks to understand the meaning of the text, the whole text, and
nothing but the text. And if one's sworn duty is to faithfully interpret and apply the Constitution-if one is a judge or other
public official who has sworn an oath to support the Constitution, or to preserve, protect, and defend it (as opposed to a mere
law professor who has sworn no such thing)-one cannot do anything else without violating one's oath.
The Constitution of the United States does not answer, or
even address, every important question of government, politics,
law, or rights. Further, some provisions of the text admit of a
fair range of meaning. But that does not mean that we have an
"unwritten constitution." It means, rather more simply, that the
written Constitution does not answer everything and therefore
leaves some matters-indeed, a great deal-to the democratic
choices made by representative government in accordance with
the structures of government created by that document. It
means that some matters are left to be worked out by government and politics, and that different choices might legitimately
be made at different times. That is hardly to say that the Constitution is "unwritten" or (just as incoherently) that its meaning
"changes" or "evolves." It is simply to say that the written Constitution does not address everything under the sun and that,
where the Constitution does not specify a rule, the Constitution
does not specify a rule. Policies are then left for the people to decide through the process of self-government. That, too, is a consequence of written constitutionalism. Where the Constitution
says nothing, it says nothing-and there is nothing more to be
said about what the Constitution says, at least not by courts
purporting to apply the Constitution as a rule of law invalidating a political choice made by legislative or executive officials.
Where the Constitution's answer to some issue is less than
clear, or where its meaning is abstract and general, the relevant
constitutional decisionmakers are left with a range of interpretive and policy choices. The only question that remains is who
gets to make those choices. That in itself is a constitutional
question to be answered from the Constitution's text and structure
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and the fair inferences that may be derived from them., There
may be linguistic indeterminacy; there may be matters left open
or incomplete; there may be genuine interpretive choices to be
made; there may be a legitimate range of disagreement about
what does or does not follow logically from the words of the text;
and there may be difficult applications.
But there is no such thing as "America's Unwritten Constitution." It is a misnomer, a hoax, a charade, a deception, a farce,
a snare, a delusion, a lawyer's trick, a pickpocket's sleight of
hand, a canard, to say that there is.

That said, Professor Akhil Reed Amar's America's Unwritten
Constitution: The Precedents and Principles We Live By is a brilliant and fun, if somewhat erratic and sometimes infuriating,
book. It is well written, smart and clever as can be, chock-full of
insights, stimulating, challenging, and provocative. It is in these
many respects a fitting sequel to America's Constitution:A Biography,2 Amar's earlier (and, I think, far better) book.3
1 The correct answer, I submit, is that the Constitution's nature as supreme law
and its structure of coequal, independent departments dictate that where the Constitution
supplies a rule of law and governmental actors (federal or state; legislative, executive, or
judicial) have acted in conflict with that rule, the judicial province and duty require
courts deciding disputes within their jurisdiction to give legal effect to the Constitution's
rule and deny legal effect to governmental acts in conflict with that rule. This is the familiar
structural-textual argument for "judicial review" set forth in Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in
The Federalist521, 524-25 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed), and Marbury v Madison,
5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803). See also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible
Myth of Marbury, 101 Mich L Rev 2706, 2711-13 (2003) (defending the correctness of
this argument and exploring its logical implications). In such instances, courts have authority to apply a rule supplied by the Constitution as a rule governing the case. (This
does not mean, however, that courts can "bind" other branches of government, acting
within their spheres, to adhere to the courts' erroneous interpretations, but that is a
slightly different separation of powers structural argument. See id at 2714-16; Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is,
83 Georgetown L J 217, 241-88 (1994).) Where the Constitution does not supply a rule
with which governmental actors' actions are in conflict, however, the text, structure, and
logic of the Constitution-the separation of powers, the coordinacy of the branches, and
the nature of the judicial power within such a scheme-dictates that the courts may not
legitimately decline to give legal effect to the actions of those actors. That is the familiar
structural-textual argument of M'Culloch v Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat) 316, 385-87
(1819). See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own
Interpretation?,103 Nw U L Rev 857, 858 (2009).
2
Akhil Reed Amar, America's Constitution:A Biography (Random House 2005).
3 I have had the pleasure of reviewing two of Amar's books before. See generally
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Book Review, How to Interpret the Constitution (and How Not
To), 115 Yale L J 2037 (2006) (reviewing America's Constitution:A Biography); Michael
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There are just two things wrong with America's Unwritten
Constitution. But they are two pretty major things: First, to be
perhaps uncharitably blunt, Amar's thesis is all wrong. Many of
his arguments and illustrations simply do not warrant the extravagant conclusion that there exists in America an unwritten
constitution that parallels, qualifies, revises, and sometimes alters
the written Constitution. Instead, what Amar's observations
ought to yield, in those many instances when they are valid, is a
methodology of smart, sensitive-to-history-and-context written
textualism as the Constitution's correct and exclusive interpretive
methodology. In some instances, his analysis straightforwardly
supports such a conclusion. In other instances, his convoluted
analysis demonstrates, indirectly, that straightforward originalmeaning textualism is a far more sensible route to correct constitutional conclusions than free-form unwritten constitutionalism.
The second problem is even more serious and flows from the
first: Amar takes his mistaken methodological inference of
untethered unwritten-ism and runs with it, sometimes rather
wildly, offering up bad arguments in support of untenable conclusions. At first gradually, and then with alarming alacrity, the
book abandons any serious disciplining constraint on what can
be said in the name of the Constitution. By the time one is halfway through this six-hundred-plus-page tome, it has become
clear that Amar's unwritten constitution permits almost any
ingenious, overclever outcome that a judge might care to reach,
including some fairly monstrous ones (such as the Supreme
Court's horrid decisions in Dred Scott v Sandford,4 Plessy v
Ferguson,5 and other notorious cases).
To be clear: Amar does not embrace all such results-he adamantly denies some of them (pp 270-74). But it is not at all obvious why his methodology could not lead where he does not
wish to go. At the same time-somewhat strangely given his
boldness at other points-Amar declines to draw other, sound
inferences from the written text; his audacity is selective.6 In the

Stokes Paulsen, Book Review, Dirty Harry and the Real Constitution, 64 U Chi L Rev
1457 (1997) (reviewing The Constitution and Criminal Procedure:FirstPrinciples). Both
books are, in a word, magnificent, as is his other major book, Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill
of Rights: Creationand Reconstruction (Yale 1998).
4
60 US (19 How) 393 (1856).
5
163 US 537 (1896).
6
For example, given Amar's views of the limited force of judicial precedent
(pp 234-37) and his defense in other scholarly work of the structural equivalence of all
federal judges, see Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separatingthe
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end, Amar's unwritten constitution consists mostly of conventional liberal political ideology, from which he dissents occasionally: He likes the results of the Warren Court, in the main, but
often prefers different reasoning (pp 141-99). In a notable departure from liberal orthodoxy, he dislikes the exclusionary rule
as a Fourth Amendment remedy (pp 114-16, 172-83) and defends
a reading of the Second Amendment that extends an individual
right to firearm possession (pp 165-66). But he embraces abortion rights, if only he could find an (unwritten) constitutional
provision to justify them (pp 122-23, 291-302). He likes gay
rights, gay marriage, and sexual liberty generally (pp 117-30).
In short, he likes judicial activism when he likes its results and
dislikes it when he dislikes its results. In the end, "America's
Unwritten Constitution" is simply Amar's unwritten constitution.
Isn't that ultimately the problem with all versions of "unwritten constitutionalism"-that they end up being simply the
mirror of their devisers' personal preferences? That they offer no
reliable disciplining methodology that could constrain their manipulation by others, in the service of their personal preferences?
That they are less reflective of the Constitution than of the interpreter? Despite the limitations of written textualism-the ambiguities of the text and the imperfections of the methodologydoes it not in the end offer a more faithful method for interpreting
and applying the Constitution than free-form unwritten-ism?
In Part I of this Review, I argue that a good bit of Amar's
analysis in America's Unwritten Constitution is actually more
supportive of the practice of written constitutionalism than the
thesis of unwritten-ism that Amar advances, and that many of
his unwritten detours are unhelpful and perplexing. In Part II, I
argue that much of the rest of Amar's unwritten constitutionalism
is simply misguided-misleading invention and extrapolation. It
is not constitutionalism at all but make-it-up-ism, and it leads to
some conclusions that are almost constitutional-nonsense propositions. In Part III, I explore the implications of Amar's unwrittenism placed in the wrong hands, or even in reasonably good
hands intent on reaching a desired result: skillfully applied,
Two Tiers of FederalJurisdiction,65 BU L Rev 205, 230 (1985), it is disappointing to see
Amar follow almost reflexively the conventional view that lower court judges must adhere
to even clearly wrong Supreme Court precedents rather than rule independently in a
manner faithful to their oath and leave it to the Supreme Court to reverse them (pp 23233). There are other instances in which Amar fails to pull the trigger: in his view of precedent
generally, see text accompanying notes 46-55; in his seeming acquiescence in judicial
supremacy; and in his deference to much of contemporary constitutional doctrine.
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Amar's unwritten constitutionalism yields any result one might
want. Finally, in Part IV, I sketch a theory of what to do with
textual indeterminacy, arguing that the text and structure of
the Constitution suggest reasonably clear answers to this particular genre of constitutional question. It is the asserted indeterminacy of the text that launches Amar's quest for the unwritten
constitution that can fill all gaps and answer all questions. But
there is a better, textual solution: the Constitution's text and
7
structure tell us what to do when textual meaning runs out.

I. UNNECESSARY, UNHELPFUL UNWRITTEN-ISM
Professor Amar's core thesis is that America has an unwritten
constitution that shadows and supplements its written one.
Sometimes Amar tenders this proposition in a soft, seemingly
unthreatening form: The unwritten constitution "supplements
but does not supplant" the written document (pp x-xi, 273). It
should not be thought "a carte blanche" to "ignore" the text's
"core commands" (p 273) or be taken to "contradict the plain
meaning.., of an express and basic element of the written Constitution" (p 74). Sometimes, however, Amar elevates the unwritten constitution to "roughly on a par with ... the canonical
text" (p 479). And sometimes the unwritten constitution actually
trumps the constitutional text: unwritten principles are capable
of revising or even repudiating the evident meaning of the text's
words, so that sometimes a provision should be read to mean
"almost the opposite" of what it seems to say (p 6). Finally, very
often (as we shall see) Amar's unwritten constitution permits
constitutional revisions in the form of unwritten add-ons to the

7
There are lesser problems with the book-problems that, ironically, parallel its
title and theme and that contrast with Amar's fabulous earlier book on the written Constitution, America's Constitution: A Biography. Unlike America's Constitution, which
(like the document it exegetes) was a lean, tight, carefully worded text, America's Unwritten Constitution (like the "undocument" it expounds) is sprawling, discursive, and
un-unified, struggling for a global theme to unite its disparate chapters and arguments.
Unlike America's Constitution, which was restrained in its style and disciplined in its
scope-not addressing every imaginable issue-America's Unwritten Constitutionis exuberant and tendentious, discussing anything and everything. The virtues of the written
Constitution of the United States include its (mostly) carefully written provisions; its
brilliant and elegant concept, structure, and logic; its relative simplicity and directness;
and its willingness to leave many things to the working-out of practical democratic representative government. America's Constitution possessed the same magnificent virtues.
Among the vices of an unwritten constitution is that it can wander, untethered, all over
the place and try to be all things to all people. America's Unwritten Constitution possesses
some of the same regrettable vices.
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constitutional text. In the end, Amar's initial disclaimers do not
disclaim all that much, and at several points he reclaims ground
he has elsewhere disclaimed, embracing some rather extravagant departures from the constitutional text.
The problem begins with first principles. As rhetorically
appealing as the term may be, there simply is no "unwritten
constitution" in America. Indeed, there cannot be such a thing,
consistent with the nature-and rather explicit terms--of America's written Constitution as a single, authoritative, binding, exclusive, written instrument of supreme law.8 Article VI of the
document specifies the document, "this Constitution"-and nothing
else-as authoritative. 9 The Preamble likewise specifies "this
Constitution," plainly referring to the text that follows, as the
written instrument ordained and established by 'Wethe People"
for governance.' 0 Article VI requires all government officers to
swear an oath to support "this Constitution," again referring to
the document just set forth." Article V specifies the means for
revising the text of "this Constitution," strongly suggesting both
that it is this text alone that counts as America's Constitution
and that the sole means of changing that Constitution is by
changing that text. 1' And Article VII concludes the original document by specifying the conditions under which "this Constitution"-the written document Article VII concluded-will be
13
deemed to have become operative.
The conclusion is hard to avoid: if the written Constitution
is the supreme, binding, authoritative law, there cannot be an
"unwritten constitution" deviating from the written textincluding, most fundamentally, the text's apparent exclusivity
as supreme law. Unwritten constitutionalism is thus, almost by
definition, in conflict with written constitutionalism as a matter
8
1 have set forth the textual argument for the exclusivity of the constitutional text
at greater length elsewhere. See Paulsen, 103 Nw U L Rev at 858-62, 869 (cited in note
1) (arguing that Article VI specifies the text of "this Constitution" as the exclusive object
of constitutional interpretation); id at 869 ("The document specifies the document as
authoritative. By very strong linguistic implication, if not quite by explicit language, the
document's specification of the document as supreme and binding would appear to exclude
anything outside the document as authoritative.... The writing is exclusive."). See also
Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's
Secret DraftingHistory, 91 Georgetown L J 1113, 1127-33 (2003).
9 US Const Art VI, cl 2.
10 US Const Preamble.
11 US Const Art VI, cl2.
12 US Const Art V.
13 US Const Art VII.
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of principle. And it is most definitely in conflict with the terms
of "this [written] Constitution." In a regime governed by an
exclusive written text uniquely designated as supreme law,
"unwritten constitutionalism" is almost literally unconstitutional unconstitutionalism.
How, then, does Amar reach his contrary conclusion? First,
he observes that a fair bit of our constitutional practice and tradition is based on inferences and deductions from the written
text (p 47). Second, he observes that some of our constitutional
practice and tradition simply cannot be deduced or derived from
the text at all, but seems to derive more from experience, lived
tradition, common practice, symbolism, or judicial invention
that has come to be accepted over time (pp 238-39). Therefore,
Amar concludes, America has an unwritten constitution.
This is almost exactly half right. The problem is that Amar
smushes together two quite different sets of phenomena, and
while both observations are correct, the normative conclusions to
be drawn from them are quite different. Logical inferences and
conclusions drawn from the text are one thing. There is a powerful argument that this is a straightforward, entirely legitimate
method of textual interpretation. Nontextual interpolations into
the text, or extrapolations from it, are different entirely. Amar
concludes that these two different strands are of a single fabric;
they are two different ways of reading "between the lines" (p 47).
They are therefore equally legitimate, and together they warrant the conclusion that America has an unwritten constitution
that supplements, qualifies, and explains the written one.
Might I propose a rather different bottom-line conclusion-a
two-part counterthesis that Amar's analysis and illustrations
better support? First, the drawing of certain deductions and inferences from the written text often might be part of what it
means to faithfully read and apply a written text-that is, it
might be simply an aspect of good, thoughtful written constitutionalism. Second, inferences not fairly derived from the text,
from its internal structure and logic, or from reliable historical
evidence of original meaning simply are not justified as interpretations of the Constitution. In short, why might it not be the
case that some inferences from the Constitution are right, but
that inferences (or interpolations) not fairly attributable to the
document are wrong?
My critique on this score proceeds in two stages: First, I set
forth certain eminently defensible structural or inferential
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principles of textual interpretation-principles in many respects
consistent with Amar's analysis. Second, I take a quick tour of
some of Amar's roundabout arguments for conclusions more sensibly grounded in straightforward textual interpretation-a tour
that yields the conclusion that much of Amar's argument for
embracing an unwritten constitution is simply unnecessary, unhelpful, and unsound.
A.

Seven Habits of Highly Effective Textual Interpreters

Some of what Amar has to say about good methodological
steps for faithful constitutional interpretation is, quite simply,
terrific. Reformulated slightly, it could be embraced by even the
most committed original-meaning textualist. As noted, however,
these valid insights into the text provide no evidence at all for a
grand theory of unwritten constitutionalism. Quite the contrary,
they reinforce and support the practice of written constitutionalism and even help rescue it from certain difficulties or criticisms.
In particular, I submit that the following are correct propositions of straightforward textual interpretation, each of which
(except perhaps the last) is consistent with substantial chunks
of Amar's discussion:
(1) Specific words and phrases, considered in historical and
linguistic context, should be understood as importing, so to
speak, specific historical conceptions and background understandings that informed readers of a document of this sort would
have taken for granted. That is part and parcel of their original
public linguistic meaning.14
(2) The text must be understood as a whole: various provisions qualify, modify, or shed light on the proper understanding
and application of other parts of the text; the overall structure
and logic of the text is part of the text; and the structure and
iogic of the document as a whole properly inform the correct understanding of particular parts. (This is a central theme in some
of Amar's best, and most important, earlier academic work.) 15
14 See Paulsen, 103 Nw U L Rev at 866-67 & n 26, 872-75, 884-88 (cited in note 1)
(embracing this position and applying it to specific examples); Kesavan and Paulsen, 91
Georgetown L J at 1127-34 (cited in note 8); Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?,90 Cal L Rev 291, 332-95, 398 (2002) (examining, in excruciating detail, the original meaning and usage of semicolons in the original
Constitution, including background grammatical principles of the era in which the Constitution was written).
15 See generally, for example, Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv L Rev
747 (1999). For the classic academic presentation of this view, see generally Charles L.
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(3) It is not at all improper constitutional interpretation to
deduce from the document certain rules of law that flow logically
from others contained in the text or discernible from its structure and operation, even if this sometimes yields mildly surprising
conclusions. (In other writing I have analogized this technique to
constructing proofs of various "theorems" in geometry and other
branches of mathematics.16 If the constitutional postulates are
sound, and the logical inferences and deductions are rigorous
and justified, the resulting theorems are also correct-justified,
ultimately, by the constitutional text-whether or not anyone
subjectively intended, expected, or contemplated such results,
and sometimes even if the text's drafters intended or expected
1
the opposite. 7)
(4) The Constitution leaves some matters of government
open for choice by future generations and admits of different
political answers at different times by different political decisionmakers; some of those options resulted in early choices as a
matter of early practice that have become more or less settled in
our political (quasiconstitutional) tradition, and others have
not. 8 But a quasiconstitutional tradition, or long-standing practice,
is not the same thing as a constitutional rule, and mere settled

Black Jr, Structure and Relationship in ConstitutionalLaw (Louisiana State 1969). See
also Paulsen, 83 Georgetown L J at 226-27 (cited in note 1). The classic judicial illustration
of this method is M'Culloch, discussed as such by both Amar (pp 22-31) and Black. See
Black, Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law at 13-15 (cited in note 15). Marbury
is another such example. See Paulsen, 101 Mich L Rev at 2711-24 (cited in note 1).
Perhaps the consummate nonjudicial practitioner of such a holistic-structural, don'tread-the-parts-apart-from-the-whole method of constitutional interpretation was President
Abraham Lincoln. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Book Review, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation,71 U Chi L Rev 691, 692-93, 703-26 (2004) (discussing structural,
practical, whole-text constitutional interpretation, as illustrated by the interpretive
methodology of Lincoln); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutionof Necessity, 79 Notre
Dame L Rev 1257, 1260-67 (2004).
16 See Paulsen, 83 Georgetown L J at 226-27 (cited in note 1) (dubbing such an approach "Euclidian").
17 I return to this critical point-that textual meaning and valid logical inferences
from the text may yield conclusions that are sound even if sometimes at variance with
the subjective expectations or intentions of the text's drafters-below, in discussing two
of Amar's illustrations: the Sixth Amendment right of criminal defendants to testify and
present evidence in their own defense, see Part I.B.1, and the meaning of "equal protection of the laws" as applied to racial segregation, see Part I.B.3.
18 For discussion of the proposition that the text sometimes affords political actors
a range of choices, admitting of different choices at different times, all within the legislative province, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Government of Adequate Powers, 31 Harv J
L & Pub Pol 991, 994-96 (2008). See also generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Dormant FourteenthAmendment (unpublished manuscript, 2013) (on file with author).
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practice can become unsettled by innovations not foreclosed by a
rule set forth in the Constitution.19
(5) Closely related to the preceding, sometimes the "single
right answer" supplied by the text of the Constitution is in fact a
range of answers-a domain from which political actors may
choose, none of which can be said (judicially) to be a "wrong"
answer in the sense of actually being unconstitutional (that is,
lying outside the domain of constitutional political choice admitted by the constitutional language).20
(6) Sometimes, reasonable interpreters can disagree concerning the meaning or range of meaning of a constitutional
provision or principle. That is, even among those who apply a
methodology of sophisticated, rigorous textualism, fair-minded
interpreters might reach different conclusions; the enterprise,
even if done faithfully and properly, simply does not always
yield uniform conclusions. (No big surprise here: reasonable
original-meaning textual interpreters will sometimes disagree
as to the correct conclusion.)
(7) And finally, (a corollary to (5) and (6)): Where the document is truly indeterminate or ambiguous on a specific point or
its application to a particular issue-where reasonable interpreters, faithfully seeking to follow the Constitution's original
meaning fairly can reach differing conclusions-the text, structure, and logic of the Constitution suggest a proper default rule.
(One might say that the text is reasonably determinate on the
question of what to do in the case of textual indeterminacy as to
specifics.) And that rule is that the people rule, through the
structures of popular representative government created by the
Constitution and by state constitutions.21 The Constitution creates a republican government with representative institutions,
vested with power to implement that Constitution and govern
19 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress
Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 Yale L J 1535, 1542-43 (2000)
(noting that "unfamiliarity does not equal unconstitutionality" and that the test of the
correctness of a legal proposition is "the soundness of the reasoning supporting it, not its
conformity with present convention").
20 See Paulsen, 31 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 994-96 (cited in note 18); Paulsen, 103
Nw U L Rev at 860, 914-18 (cited in note 1). Below, I argue that this suggests a "rule of
construction," or hermeneutic principle, that courts should uphold the actions of political
branches of government if such actions fall within the range of meaning afforded by a
broadly worded text, and that this rule is justified on a straightforward interpretation of
the words and structure of the document itself. See text accompanying notes 94-100 and
103-06.
21 See note 1. For further elaboration, see Part IV.
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pursuant to its terms, in all respects not inconsistent with those
terms.
Each of the above propositions is, I submit, consistent with
rigorous, principled, written-text-is-exclusive, original-publicmeaning textualism. None requires a text-defying leap to the
conclusion that we have an "unwritten constitution." Thus, one
can go along, a good part of the way, with Amar's analysis and
yet vigorously disagree with his thesis that we have an unwritten
constitution that complements and supplements our written
Constitution.
A fair bit of what Amar has to say, especially in the earliest
chapters of the book, can be reconciled in some fashion or another
with these seven principles. Indeed, much of Amar's best analysis
and resulting conclusions could be recast as exercises in textualism, thoughtfully applied. Amar's treatments of, for example,
M'Culloch v Maryland22 (pp 22-31), the Guarantee Clause as
applied to Reconstruction powers (pp 79-88), and even modern
First Amendment doctrine (pp 33-34, 151-72) can be accommodated to this description reasonably well: The text's structure
and logic, as well as specific clauses, compel certain conclusions
about the allowable scope of legislative judgment to effectuate
national powers and the supremacy of national law over inconsistent state law (M'Culloch).23 A text's objective meaning is not
necessarily congruent with its drafters' expectations, and grants
of power thus may be capable of new applications in new circumstances, including civil war and the abolition of slavery (the
Guarantee Clause).24 And thoughtful reflection on the meaning,
in linguistic, political, and structural context, of terms like
"Congress," "no law," "abridging," "speech," and "press" indeed
yields a surprising amount of modern First Amendment doctrine as a matter of straightforward textual explication, not
unmoored extrapolation. 25 Indeed, in Amar's earlier scholarly
17 US (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
See Paulsen, 31 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 995-96, 1002 (cited in note 18) (arguing
that the Constitution confers on Congress sweeping legislative powers).
24 Consider Kesavan and Paulsen, 90 Cal L Rev at 308-32 (cited in note 14) (defending
the correctness of Lincoln's constitutional views concerning the unlawfulness of secession
and the propriety of various legal fictions concerning "reconstruction" of so-called seceded
states, in part on Guarantee Clause grounds).
25 US Const Amend I. For a short account of how these words themselves inform
contemporary First Amendment doctrine through a thoughtful, textualist approach, see
Paulsen, 103 Nw U L Rev at 907-09 (cited in note 1). Amar's discussion of various aspects
of First Amendment doctrine is scattered throughout the book (pp 503, 605) (textual and
topical indexes).
22
23
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work-especially in his already-classic article Intratextualismhe had portrayed some of these very illustrations as examples of
sophisticated textualism, not as proof that we have a parallel,
26
unwritten constitution supplementing the text.
B.

Some Unnecessary, Unhelpful, Unwritten Excursions

But several of Amar's other examples-cast by Amar as illustrative situations that demonstrate features of our supposed
unwritten constitution-would be far better recast in terms of
arguments from constitutional text, original public meaning,
constitutional structure, and straightforward logical derivation.
In many such instances, Amar's analysis is needlessly roundabout. Thoughtful textualism would get him where he wants to go
far more securely. There are perhaps a dozen instances of this in
the book, but three telling illustrations should more than suffice:
the right of a criminal defendant to testify; the power of Congress to institute a military draft; and the unconstitutionality of
government racial segregation. I take up each in turn, followed
by a fourth, more global illustration of awkward, circuitous, and
often misleading analysis: Amar's unclear embrace of judicial
doctrine and precedent in conflict with the written Constitution.
1. Does the written Constitution provide a right to testify?
Consider, first, a question that Amar thinks provides powerful proof of unwritten constitutionalism (pp 98-110): Do criminal
defendants have the constitutional right to testify in their own
defense and to present physical evidence of their innocence?
Amar thinks that finding such a right requires either unwritten
constitutionalism or a reading of the Ninth Amendment that
permits judicial recognition of federal constitutional rights not
otherwise stated in the text. This is so, according to Amar, because under Founding-era evidence rules, "defendants were
never allowed to take the stand to testify on their own behalf"
(p 104), and such a result seems odd today (p 99).
Set to one side the implication that the Constitution must
be read to embrace all good things (by today's lights)-a thoroughly antitextual notion that presumes that today's policy desires should steer interpretation of a text's meaning to the desired

26

See Amar, 112 Harv L Rev at 749-58, 812-17 (cited in note 15).
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result.27 Set to one side also the flawed assumption that a text's

objective meaning otherwise would be determined by contemporaneous practice at the time of its adoption. That too is sloppy
thinking: as noted above, objective linguistic meaning of course
can differ from subjective expectations or from practice.2s Sometimes expectation and practice are simply contrary to the text.
A yet more basic problem infects this example: Amar's weneed-more-than-the-text gambit is not at all necessary to justify
his desired conclusion that the accused has a constitutional
right to testify and present evidence on his own behalf. Both the
Fifth Amendment's text and the Sixth Amendment's text support the inference that the accused has such procedural rights.
The idea that "due process"-the core traditional notion that an
accused cannot be deprived of his liberty without notice and an
opportunity to be heard-includes a criminal defendant's right
to testify in his own defense is scarcely an extravagant flight
from the text, even if common law evidence rules were to the
contrary. 29 Likewise, it hardly seems a stretch of the Sixth
Amendment's language to say that an accused's right to "compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor" includes a

right to a legal process in which he may obtain his own testimony
30
as a witness in his favor and present what evidence he has.
And finally, the Fifth Amendment's recognition of a right not to

27 Any methodology of "interpreting' the Constitution under which the document
lines up perfectly with all of one's policy preferences ought to be regarded as highly suspect. That is surely less documentary interpretation than personal projection. See
Paulsen, 103 Nw U L Rev at 912, 916 n 179 (cited in note 1). Indeed, one can fairly evaluate whether the Constitution lines up with one's policy preferences only by first interpreting the document-that is, seeking to ascertain the meaning of its words-and then
(and only then) evaluating the document in terms of its political consequences. The two
enterprises are distinct. See id at 910-11, 918-19.
28 See text accompanying notes 16-17.
29 It should be no surprise that the legal effect of a new written text might be to
displace a common law rule. Texts do that all the time. It is barely more of a surprise
that this might not have been immediately seen, or that initial practice should have
stuck with tradition, not realizing the ways in which it had been superseded, whether
specifically intended or not, by the rule of a newly enacted text. As Amar himself puts
the point later in the book: "People who live through a revolution do not always immediately appreciate just what they have wrought" (p 286).
30 See Rock v Arkansas, 483 US 44, 52 (1987) ('The right to testify is also found in
the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which grants a defendant the
right to call 'witnesses in his favor."'); id at 51 (noting a Fifth Amendment textual basis
in the due process right "to be heard"). Amar mentions Rock but does not discuss the
Court's textual points about the Sixth and Fifth Amendments, even as he asserts flatly
that "the right is not enumerated in the written Constitution" and dubs the Rock decision "activist" (p 106).
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be compelled to be a witness against oneself would seem indirectly to confirm that an accused's testimony is not otherwise
outside the ambit of compulsory legal process. 31
Sure, the text could have been more explicit on the specific
point, especially given that prior prevailing practice was to the
contrary. The textual argument is not an absolute knockout
punch. But it is a reasonably sensible argument derived from
the text itself, without going on any Ninth Amendment benders.
Why the rush to find an "unwritten constitution" or posit that
the text should be construed to locate such a claimed right "directly in principles of truth, justice, and the American way as
understood and practiced by the American people" (p 103)? Amar's
illustration does not support his conclusion at all. To the contrary,
it suggests a rather different one: read the text carefully, in linguistic context; read the whole text, including related specific
provisions; and do not let practice or convention detract from or
contradict textual meaning, because the text may in fact state a
rule departing from convention.
2. Does the written Constitution grant the power to impose
a military draft?
Consider another example that Amar develops at length:
whether Congress has the power to institute a military draft.
One would think the simplest route to the obvious answeryes-is that Congress is specifically given the explicit, unequivocal
textual powers "[t]o raise and support Armies" and "[t]o provide
and maintain a Navy" and, by virtue of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, granted a range of choices as to the means for "carrying
into Execution the foregoing powers. ' 32

31 For more on the meaning of the Fifth Amendment and its relationship to common
law disqualification, see Paulsen, Book Review, 64 U Chi L Rev at 1486-89 (cited in note 3).
32 US Const Art I, § 8,cls 12-13, 18. Lincoln's (unpublished) opinion on the draft
makes the constitutional argument as simply and clearly as possible:

The case simply is the constitution provides that the congress shall have power
to raise and support armies; and, by this act, the congress has exercised the
power to raise and support armies. This is the whole of it. It is a law made in
litteral [sic] pursuance of this part of the United States Constitution ....The
constitution gives congress the power, but it does not prescribe the mode, or
expressly declare who shall prescribe it. In such case congress must prescribe
the mode, or relinquish the power.
The power is given fully, completely,
unconditionally.
Abraham Lincoln, Opinion on the Draft, in Don E. Fehrenbacher, ed, Abraham Lincoln:
Speeches and Writings 1859-1865 504-06 (Library of America 1989).
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Amar eventually reaches the same bottom-line conclusion,
but through a peculiar, circuitous route. It is worth following
him on this tour, for it is reasonably representative of his methodological quest for an unwritten American constitution. Amar
begins with the premise that such an unwritten constitution includes inferences that might be derived from acts of the nation
or the people, especially in the course of enacting a text, and
that these inferences can go beyond the words of the document
(pp 51, 94). (This is one of Amar's least tendentious principles of
textual extrapolation.) Amar then sets out at length the historical position that the Reconstruction Amendments were enacted
in part as a consequence of force of arms in the course of the Civil
War and its aftermath (pp 88-94). This does not make those
amendments illegitimate, Amar notes (correctly) (pp 92-94).33
But he also finds in this history unwritten implications for discovery of a congressional power to conscript for national military
service-a power, Amar suggests, that had not before existed
(p 92). According to Amar, the act of adopting the Second
Amendment had, back in the 1790s, implicitly enacted an unwritten principle of the primacy of state militias (p 90). But with
the events of the Civil War in the 1860s, the army of the nation
became the locus of military power, displacing the old unwritten
rule with a new unwritten rule. Thus, the unwritten principle
implicit in the adoption of the Second Amendment was overtaken
by the unwritten principle implicit in the experience of the Civil
War and the subsequent act of adopting the Fourteenth
Amendment-to some extent, at the point of a gun. "The highprofile deployment of the Union Army to guarantee a regime of
true republican governments undercut the central ideological
premise of the Second Amendment's preamble" (p 91). Thus,
Amar argues, a national draft is now (that is, post-Civil War)34
constitutionally valid:

33 For an argument that the Reconstruction Amendments were validly adopted in
accordance with the rules set forth in the text of Article V, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, A
General Theory of Article V The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 Yale L J 677, 706-12 (1993); Kesavan and Paulsen, 90 Cal L Rev at 325-30
(cited in note 14); John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68
U Chi L Rev 375, 419-57 (2001).
34 It is not clear whether Amar thinks that the authorization for a draft during the
Civil War itself was constitutional. This is an obvious problem with his glossing-andunglossing approach: Do actions departing from a prior, unwritten constitutional "principle" violate that principle? Or do they constitute (unwritten) constitutional amendments
that supersede that principle? Can unwritten constitutional provisions be rewritten (if that
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Nothing in the 1860s vision repudiated the Founders' explicit written commands, even as this unwritten vision superseded earlier unwritten understandings. Nowhere did
the Founders' text explicitly provide that the army clauses
should be construed narrowly lest they undercut America's
militia system. Nowhere did the Founders' text explicitly
bar a national army draft if such a draft were deemed necessary to execute the laws, suppress insurrections, or repel
invasions. Nowhere did the Founders' text explicitly say
that every conscript must be officered locally. Rather, these
things were arguably implicit in Article I as glossed by
Amendment II. These unwritten understandings should ultimately give way to a later principle of the unwritten Constitution celebrating the army as a proper engine of national
defense and republican government.
It is these acts of amendment during Reconstruction, rather
than the formal texts of the Founding, as understood by the
Founders, that best justify the current legal gloss on the
army clause of Article I. Under this gloss, the army clause is
now read as giving Congress general power to conscript soldiers. (pp 91-92)
That is quite an argument. But most of it seems utterly unnecessary and perplexing. Wouldn't it be more straightforward
(and more accurate) to state, simply, that the Constitution says
that Congress has the power to raise and support armies and
provide for and maintain a navy, and then dispense with all the
unwritten glosses glossing other, earlier unwritten glosses? One
can drive to Chicago by way of Anchorage, but it's not exactly
the most direct route, at least not from most places in America.
And there are problems galore with Amar's elaborate, circuitous
detour, not the least of which is all the unwritten constitutional
hitchhikers he is tempted to pick up along the way. The text not
only better supports Amar's conclusion than does his unwritten
constitutional excursion, but also provides a more secure and
less readily manipulated answer.

is the right word) by subsequent unwritten constitutional provisions? How can one tell if
this is the case?
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3. Does the written Constitution prohibit racial segregation
by law?
A third example of a convoluted unwritten-constitution approach when a straightforward written-constitution approach
would do is Amar's treatment of the now-classic question framed
by Brown v Board of Education of Topeka:35 Does the Fourteenth
Amendment forbid racial segregation?
Once again, the written Constitution supplies a reasonably
direct (if contestable) answer. Or at least it does if one focuses on
the objective original linguistic meaning of the words of the text,
in context, rather than on the subjective intentions or expectations of specific persons involved in the process of enacting
36
them-a distinction foundational to written constitutionalism.
"No state shall... deny to any person ...the equal protection of
the laws"37 would appear to state a sufficiently determinate rule
that the government may not treat classes of persons differently
and adversely for purposes of legal privileges and entitlements
because of race (or because of certain other immutable characteristics not legitimately related to such rights and privileges).38
There is perhaps some room to argue about whether this is the
necessary meaning of the words of the text, and over the exact
scope of the principle stated. But it is not much of a textual
stretch at all: it is a reasonably straight-line reading of the language; if there is room to argue over this reading, it is not a
great deal of room.

347 US 483 (1954).
36 See text accompanying notes 16-17. There is a fundamental distinction between
the formal content of a rule stated in a legal text-its objective meaning-and the mere
subjective expectations or intentions held by some (or many) persons about how that rule
would or should be applied. The latter may be indirect evidence of the meaning of the
language or terms: intention and expectation sometimes might be competent, pertinent,
and probative data concerning actual linguistic meaning. But, in principle, the objective
linguistic meaning of constitutional language might differ from anyone's specific expectations or predictions about how that meaning might apply in particular instances. See
Paulsen, 83 Georgetown L J at 227 n 23 (cited in note 1) (collecting authorities); Paulsen,
103 Nw U L Rev at 873-75 (cited in note 1); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal
Interpretation, 12 Harv L Rev 417, 417-19 (1899) ("Ve do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.").
37 US Const Amend XIV § 1.
38 See Paulsen, 103 Nw U L Rev at 901-02 (cited in note 1); Paulsen, 83
Georgetown L J at 227 n 23 (cited in note 1) (arguing that the necessary meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment's language "entails a prohibition on racial segregation or other
racial discrimination by state law" irrespective of the intentions or expectations of some
drafters that the language would not have this consequence).
35
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The Brown question then becomes whether this principle is
violated when the state, by law, segregates public education on
the basis of race. In the real-world factual and social context of
the practice of racial segregation in nineteenth- and twentiethcentury America, the answer was an embarrassingly obvious
yes. 39 The fact that not all persons in the generation that drafted
and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment recognized this is largely
beside the point: it does not alter the meaning of the language
used in the Constitution, nor does it alter the reality that racial
segregation violated that meaning.40 Brown was rightly decided
and Plessy was wrongly decided, on reasonably straightforward
textual-interpretation reasoning.
Amar's approach is far more involved. But it also seems far
more vulnerable as a matter of constitutional reasoning. He begins with the statement that "many congressional supporters [of
the Fourteenth Amendment] emphatically stated that it would
not prohibit segregation" (p 146). Amar then leafs through the
pages of his unwritten constitution and finds this to say about
that:
In the end, faithful constitutional interpreters must investigate not merely how many segregationists existed in
39 See generally Charles L. Black Jr, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions,
69 Yale L J 421 (1960). Professor Charles Black describes the argument for the correctness of Brown as "awkwardly simple": the Equal Protection Clause forbids directly disadvantaging blacks as such, and enforced legal segregation constitutes a very serious
such disadvantaging. Id at 421, 424:

[I]f a whole race of people finds itself confined within a system which is set up
and continued for the very purpose of keeping it in an inferior station, and if
the question is then solemnly propounded whether such a race is being treated
"equally," I think we ought to exercise one of the sovereign prerogatives of philosophers-that of laughter.
Indeed, there exists important historical evidence that the generation that
adopted the Fourteenth Amendment by and large understood its anti-racial-separation
implications. For an important scholarly article advancing this view, see generally Michael
W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 Va L Rev 947 (1995).
The earliest Supreme Court decisions following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment treated segregation as a denial of legal equality on the basis of race, holding such
racial segregations and exclusions unlawful. See Railroad Co v Brown, 84 US 445, 45253 (1873) (holding that racial segregation in transportation violates a federal statute forbidding discrimination on the basis of race). See also Strauder v West Virginia, 100 US
303, 308-09 (1879) (holding that racial exclusion from jury service violates the Fourteenth
Amendment). As I have noted in other writing: "It took an aggressively nontextualist, 'purposivist,' social-policy, evolving-meaning, underlying-principle-ish judicial approach to constitutional interpretation to erase that prior understanding of the text and establish segregation as constitutional for six decades." Paulsen, 103 Nw U L Rev at 901 n 135 (cited
in note 1).
40
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1866-1868 but also what they said and did and whether
their words and deeds plausibly glossed the Fourteenth
Amendment. In short, we must probe how the unwritten
Constitution of the mid-1860s interacted with the written
Constitution itself. (p 147) (emphasis added)
This turns out all right, thankfully: "Ultimately, nothing in
what segregationists actually said or did provides good grounds
for revising our initial understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment's central meaning" (p 148).
This is both convoluted and troubling. Why on earth offer
quarter to questions of "how many segregationists" there were
and whether their "words" or "deeds" (their deeds?) "plausibly
glossed" the Constitution (p 147)? Do we really need to--should
we, really-"probe how" the supposed "unwritten Constitution of
the mid-1860s," embracing to some extent segregation, "interacted with" the actual, written Constitution (p 147)? Isn't the
argument from text alone a much better one? Once again, Amar's
unwritten constitution provides an answer that is at once unnecessarily circuitous-even confounding-and less persuasive
than that provided by the text of the written Constitution, applied in accordance with the original linguistic meaning of its
terms rather than the subjective intentions or expectations of
41
some of its sponsors.

41 Most critics of original-meaning written constitutionalism take a rather different
tack on Brown. They argue that segregation was consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment's original understanding because many people at the time thought it was.
This is then supposed to demonstrate the need for an evolving-meaning, justice-driven
approach to constitutional interpretation. For the classic statement of this view, see generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understandingand the Segregation Decision,
69 Harv L Rev 1 (1955). Original-meaning textualists respond that what matters is not
subjective intention or expectation but the objective, original meaning of the text itself
and that the irreducible necessary meaning of "equal protection of the laws" includes a
rule barring official discrimination on the basis of race-period, full stop. See, for example,
Paulsen, 83 Georgetown L J at 227 n 23 (cited in note 1); Steven G. Calabresi and Livia Fine,
Two Cheers for Professor Balkin's Originalism,103 Nw U L Rev 663, 668-69, 686 (2009).
The anti-originalists' debate with original-meaning textualists is thus joined at the
point of what constitutes the original meaning of the text. Anti-originalists think (wrongly)
that textual meaning is coextensive with subjective intentions or expectations; they deplore written constitutionalism because they dislike the results they (mistakenly) think
that it yields. Original-meaning textualists, however, think that written constitutionalism
is a matter of objective linguistic meaning, not subjective intention, and they think that
Brown is sound on such premises.
Amar is not fully in either camp. He thinks that the content of the Constitution lies
not in the original meaning of its text but in the "interaction" of that meaning with various aspects of our unwritten constitutional tradition--enacted meaning, lived practice,
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In a later chapter, Amar returns to Brown and segregation,
making a somewhat different argument. The Constitution's text,
Amar writes, often is in need of judicial implementation going
beyond bare interpretation(p 212). Thus, courts have the power
to fashion doctrinal "sub-rules" that are not "found in or logically
deduced from the written Constitution" (p 217). Amar argues
that the meaning of "equal protection of the laws" is one of those
areas inviting judges to fill in the gaps with doctrine of their
own creation:
The terse text did not-and could not realistically be expected to-answer all these second-order issues about how
to implement the equality norm in the particular milieu of
mid-twentieth-century Jim Crow. The written Constitution
simply laid down the civil-equality principle and entrusted
courts (among others) with the task of making that principle real in court and on the ground as the genuine law of the
land. The rule announced on May 17, 1954-that de jure
segregation would be presumed unequal in light of the actual history of Jim Crow-was a thoroughly proper way for
the Court to discharge its duty of constitutional implementation. (p 212)
Brown is right, according to Amar, because it is permissible for
judges to formulate legal doctrine using the indeterminate text
as a starting point from which to build and fill in details. Segregation is not necessarily forbidden by the Constitution's language forbidding denial of equal protection of the laws, but forbidding segregation is an allowable judicial "implementation" of
that language (p 212).
This is troubling. If Amar's notion is right-if "equal protection of the laws" has no determinate meaning with respect to the
question of legally compelled racial segregation-then why
wasn't Plessy rightly decided? Applying Amar's methodology on
its own terms, one might well conclude that evidence of contemporaneous intention undermines what might otherwise be
thought the natural linguistic meaning of "equal protection of
the laws," opening the door to considerations of lived experience,
"careful consideration of contemporary social meanings and
popular understandings with regard to ... liberty and equality"
(p 304), and judicial discretion to develop doctrines to fill perceived
judicial doctrine, and precedent (pp 19-20). But why exactly this yields Brown, and not
Plessy, is unclear.
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gaps left open by the text. Voil&! Isn't this a near-perfect description of the reasoning of Plessy?42 So why wasn't Plessy's
separate-but-equal doctrine fully as legitimate for its day-as
permissible an "implementation" of the indeterminate principle
of equal protection-as Brown's rejection of separate but equal
was for its day?
Amar comes perilously close to embracing such a stance:
"[H]ad the Court in 1954 simply said 'equality, equality, equality'
in all realms of public citizenship ... the justices would have
had to make clear that the Court had been wrong from day one
in Plessy" (p 214). Yes, indeed. But what exactly would have
been wrong with that? Does Amar really mean to suggest that
the justices weren't wrong in Plessy? Why on earth would anyone
not want to say that Plessy always was wrong-wrong when decided, wrong in 1954, wrong today-rather than say that it is all
up to the judges' sub-rules at different times, which presumably
could change yet again in the future?
4. Does precedent supersede the written Constitution?
That question, and Amar's apparent answer, highlights yet
another problematic feature of Amar's unwritten constitutionalism: for Amar, the problem with acknowledging forthrightly the
wrongness of a judicial precedent-Plessy or any other-is that
it would undermine the value of stare decisis, the judicial policy
of (sometimes) adhering to past judicial interpretations of the Con43
stitution simply because they are past judicial interpretations.
42

Plessy infamously embraced a regime of separate but equal as satisfying the

Fourteenth Amendment. It is rather disturbing how closely the elements of the Court's
analysis resemble the elements of Amar's unwritten constitutionalism. The Plessy
Court's argument, in a nutshell, was that, while the Fourteenth Amendment's object was
the "absolute equality of the two races before the law," it "could not have been intended"
(intention) "to enforce social ... equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms
unsatisfactory to either." Plessy, 163 US at 544. Segregation does not "imply the inferiority
of either race," as illustrated by the "common" social practices of "separate schools for
white and colored children" and laws banning racial intermarriage (lived experience). Id
at 545. The question thus came down to "reasonableness." Id at 550. The legislature, in
judging this, was "at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, customs, and
traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort" (lived experience, again). Id.
Plessy is, in short, as nearly pure an example of unwritten constitutionalism as they
come, counterbalancing the text with considerations of experience, social and cultural
understandings, and lived realities.
43 This is the essence of the doctrine of stare decisis-adherence to a decision simply because it is precedent, irrespective of its correctness or incorrectness. See Frederick
Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan L Rev 571, 571, 575 (1987); Paulsen, 109 Yale L J at 1538 n 8
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Amar argues that it would be institutionally embarrassing
for the Court to have to admit to serious error (pp 230-31). It is
therefore "understandable" that the Court might, "for reasons of
institutional prestige," "downplay admission of past error" and
say that a past case "was perhaps sensible when decided, but
has been eclipsed by later legal and factual developments that
could not have been perfectly foreseen when the Court first
acted" (p 236).
This is not exactly a commendable stance. Indeed, when it
amounts to posturing to save judicial face, it borders on the outright dishonest. Yet Amar embraces precisely such posturing,
because he regards judicial precedent-and judge-made "doctrine" generally-as core features of America's unwritten constitution (pp 201-41). But accommodating judicial doctrine and
precedent at variance with the written Constitution requires
some rather intricate analytical gymnastics. Amar's theory of
when judges should follow precedent illustrates the same problems inherent to unwritten-ism generally: First, most of it is
unnecessary-if precedent is already consistent with the written
Constitution, the precedent adds nothing new to analysis of the
Constitution. Second, the rest of it is improper-if precedent is
inconsistent with the written Constitution, following precedent
44
is unfaithful to the Constitution.
Amar's position on the force of judicial precedent is rather
revealingly incoherent. It exposes, unintentionally, a deep underlying tension between a strong theory of stare decisis and fidelity
to a written constitution. On the one hand, Amar writes, the
document is primary. Judicial decisions contrary to the Constitution are simply violations of the Constitution:
If the justices generally felt free (or obliged!) to follow clearly
erroneous case law concerning the core meaning of the Constitution, then the foundational document might ultimately
be wholly eclipsed. . . . If the written Constitution indeed
contemplated this odd result, one would expect to see a rather clear statement to that effect: "This Constitution may

(cited in note 19). See also Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey,
505 US 833, 854, 857 (1992) (characterizing the doctrine of stare decisis as imposing a
general obligation to follow precedent "whether or not mistaken").
44 See Paulsen, 101 Mich L Rev at 2732 (cited in note 1) (arguing that stare decisis,
in the strong sense of deliberately adhering to precedents even if wrong, is unconstitutional, and that stare decisis, if employed in support of a result independently reached, is
a pure makeweight).
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be wholly superseded by conceded judicial misinterpretations; all branches are oath-bound to follow these misinterpretations." But the Constitution says nothing of the sort.
On the contrary, it explicitly and self-referentially obliges
all officials to swear oaths to itself, not to conceded misinterpretations of it. (p 237)
This is a powerful textual argument against the doctrine of
stare decisis in any strong form that would accord decisionaltering weight to prior misinterpretations. 45 A strong version of
stare decisis is also, as Amar points out, in conflict with the
Constitution's structural logic of separation of powers and coordinacy of the branches under the supremacy of the written
Constitution:
The Constitution establishes a system of coordinate powers.
If neither the legislature nor the executive may unilaterally
change the document's meaning, why may the judiciary?
The Constitution details elaborate checks and balances. If
conceded misinterpretations become the supreme law of the
land, what checks adequately limit judicial selfaggrandizement? ... [I]t seems perverse to insist that We
the People must repeat what We said whenever judges garble what We said the first time. . . . [J]udicial review presupposes that judges are enforcing the people's document,
not their own deviations. Departures from the documentamendments-should come from the people, not from the
high court. Otherwise we are left with constitutionalism
without the Constitution, popular sovereignty without the
people. (pp 237-38)
So far, so good-in fact, really good. But then Amar reverses
course abruptly and throws it all away in the next paragraph:
"When the citizenry has widely and enthusiastically embraced
an erroneous precedent," he writes, then a "court of equity may

45 I have made similar arguments in other writing. See Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Lincoln and Judicial Authority, 83 Notre Dame L Rev 1227, 1228-29 (2008); Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court's Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis Require Adherence to the Supreme Court's Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?, 86 NC L Rev 1165,
1172-1200 (2008); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of
Precedent, 22 Const Commen 289, 289-91 (2005); Paulsen, 101 Mich L Rev at 2731-34
(cited in note 1); Paulsen, 109 Yale L J at 1548-49 & n 38 (cited in note 19); Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of ConstitutionalInterpretation: Some Modest Proposalsfrom the Twenty-Third Century, 59 Albany L Rev 671, 68081 (1995).
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sometimes" treat the precedent as "sufficiently ratified by the
American people so as to insulate it from judicial overruling"
(p 238).
Mind you, this is assuming that the precedent is flat-out
wrong-in Amar's own words, a "conceded misinterpretation," a
"judicial self-aggrandizement" that "unilaterally change[s] the
document's meaning" in a way tantamount to "constitutionalism
without the Constitution" (pp 237-38). No matter: "If enough
people believe in a given right and view it as fundamental"believe in it?-"then that right is for these very reasons a right of
the people," and it "does not matter how the people's belief
arose-even if it arose as a result of a Supreme Court case that
was wrong as a matter of text and original intent when decided'
(p 239) (emphasis added). For Amar, two wrongs literally make
a right: the Court should (sometimes) "affirm the originally erroneous precedent" because the case, "though wrong when decided,
has become right" by virtue of the people's embrace of the judicial usurpation (p 239) (emphasis added).
Amar's stance on precedent resembles in certain ways his
argument for recognizing "lived rights" generally (p 97)-a claim
that I discuss in greater detail in Part 11.46 In each instance, creation of unwritten constitutional law works in only one direction.
Lived rights can be created but not rescinded; no new right can
cut back on an existing one (p 136). Likewise, judicial decisions
that arguably interpret rights "too broadly" can become binding
precedents, and thus insulated from overruling, if citizens embrace them (pp 238-39). If courts interpret rights "too narrowly"
and citizens enthusiastically embrace those holdings, however,
that's a precedential horse of a different color: "Even if both cases
come to be widely embraced by the citizenry, only the rightsexpanding case interacts with the text of the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments so as to specially immunize it from subsequent reversal" (p 239).
Is this not obviously unprincipled and result-oriented? The
problems with this position positively leap from the page. First,
there is no principled metric for determining when the necessary
citizen enthusiasm for embracing a wrong precedent exists, so as
to transform judicial wrong into constitutional right. (Presumably,

46

See notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
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though, judges know the citizenry's enthusiastic embrace of
their erroneous precedents when they see it.)47
Second, it is a rather basic analytic mistake to think that
"rights" flow in one political direction only, and that "broad" and
"narrow" views of rights are self-defining. Whether a precedent
expands or contracts rights depends entirely on one's characterization of the right (and the rights-bearer) in question. Does Roe
v Wade48 interpret "privacy" rights too broadly (a judicial error
that can become an entrenched right)?49 Or did it interpret the
"right to life" and to the equal protection of the laws too narrowly
(an error that the Court can correct)?50 Does the exclusionary
rule interpret Fourth Amendment rights too broadly (popularly
embraceable error) or does it underprotect citizens' rights to justice and public safety (judicially correctable error)? Do cases
withholding equal state benefits from students attending religious schools interpret Establishment Clause rights too "broadly"
or Free Exercise and Free Speech Clause rights too "narrowly"?
(What about decisions holding the reverse?) Even Plessy could
be conceived of either as treating rights (of a certain kind)
broadly or treating rights narrowly.51

47 Amar's formula for unwritten "lived rights" generally is that they spring into being when there exists "[a] strongly held belief by 55 percent of Americans that they have
a constitutional right" (p 136). Perhaps, on Amar's view, public opinion polls could be
conducted measuring support for judges' erroneous constitutional decisions, and if the
requisite 55 percent approval is obtained (at any point in time), then the decision (if
"rights-expanding") would be deemed entrenched and permanent by virtue of the doctrine of stare decisis, no matter how wrong as an original matter (p 239).
48 410 US 113 (1973).
49 Id at 152-53.
50 Id at 156-57. For a discussion of the plausibility, on textual and historical
grounds, of the position that the Court construed the rights of fetal human beings in an
unjustifiably narrow fashion, see generally Michael Stokes, The Plausibility of Personhood, 74 Ohio State L J 13 (2013).
51 Amar's other theory for how precedent legitimately might alter the written Constitution is that an otherwise-wrong judicial decision may become a legal right if litigants "may have reasonably relied upon prior case law" (p 239). That is, an erroneous
decision may become a vested right not by virtue of broad popular acceptance but by virtue of special-case subjective private reliance. This is a more conventional position; the
Supreme Court has often defended its practice of (selective) stare decisis by reference to
the need to protect reliance interests. See Paulsen, 109 Yale L J at 1553-56 (cited in note
19) (collecting and discussing examples, and critiquing the analysis). But the justification for this position remains unclear, and Amar's two-paragraph discussion does not
offer much enlightenment: precedents "create facts on the ground that properly influence" subsequent application of the law (p 239). Amar does not explain what "facts" judicial error creates aside from the erroneous precedent itself, why this should "properly
influence" subsequent application of the law, or when, why, and how subjective private
reliance should entrench constitutional error. Should Brown have reaffirmed Plessy on
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Finally, again returning to Plessy and Brown, it is not at all
clear why, on Amar's own criteria, Plessy would not be a good
case for application of the doctrine of stare decisis. Recall that
Amar does not even appear prepared to say that Plessy was
wrongly decided as an initial matter. 2 Brown was correct, but
on the ground that it was a permissible (not a required) judicial
"implementation" of equal protection, not on the ground that
Plessy was an impermissible one (p 212). Yet Amar writes, further, that "if the current Court believes that the past Court did
not err in interpreting the Constitution, but merely chose a
suboptimal set of implementing sub-rules that nonetheless fell
within the range of plausible implementations, the current justices may properly choose to let the matter stand" (p 234).
Again: Why isn't this a description of Plessy? If what makes
Brown right is that it is an allowable judicial doctrinal subrule-not the fact that Plessy was wrong from the get-go-why
shouldn't Brown have stuck with Plessy on the ground that
Plessy's separate-but-equal doctrinal sub-rule likewise "fell within
the range of plausible implementations"? Why wouldn't this be
the perfect case for stare decisis? All of Amar's precedentfavoring factors are there: general public acceptance and embrace of Plessy as long-standing precedent; decades of vested
private social and public reliance on the rule of Plessy as an established fact on the ground; and the principle of deference to a
past decision that merely adopted a suboptimal set of implementing sub-rules that nonetheless fell within the range of
plausible implementations of the indeterminate notion of "equal
protection of the laws" (pp 234, 238-39).
Amar of course does not say that Brown should have reaffirmed Plessy on the basis of stare decisis. Instead, as noted, he
says (generically and not about Plessy in particular) that "for
reasons of institutional prestige, the Court might prefer, when
overruling itself, to do so on grounds that downplay admission of
past error" (p 236). But surely this is improper if anything is: In
what sense is it faithful to the Constitution to overrule Plessy on
less than perfectly honest and forthright grounds, piecemeal, in
order to avoid acknowledging that Plessy was out-and-out error?
Yet Amar seems to think that this might be proper. Not only do
the rationale that vested social and economic private reliance had been built up around
legal segregation, or that the fact of the decision in Plessy itself created new "facts on the
ground" requiring adherence to Plessy as a precedent?
52
See note 79 and accompanying text.
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two wrongs (sometimes) make a constitutional right, but dishonesty is sometimes the best judicial policy.
Amar's approach to doctrine and precedent thus permits the
judicial interpreter to go in whichever direction he or she likes
with precedent: overrule a prior case; dishonestly distinguish it
(or take disingenuous baby steps toward overruling it) for the
sake of preserving "institutional prestige"; or uphold a precedent
as being "within the range" of plausible doctrinal "implementations" of an indeterminate text. Take your pick. 53 In the end,
Amar's theory of precedent is vulnerable to the same charges
that can be leveled against his unwritten constitutionalism generally: it is inconsistent with constitutional text; it has no principled starting point or stopping point; and it is capable of being
deployed to achieve any result and can justify entrenching the
results the interpreter likes and overturning the ones he does not.
The right rule is the one that Amar started with before his
exceptions ate it: judicial precedents in conflict with the Constitution never properly can be accorded precedence over the Constitution itself.54 Doctrine, practice, and precedent in conflict
with the Constitution are not part of any "unwritten constitution." They are simply doctrines, practices, and precedents in
conflict with our written Constitution. Stare decisis, in the
strong sense of deliberate adherence to concededly wrong prior
decisions, is simply unconstitutional.55

There is a straighter path to each of these outcomes. An accused in a criminal proceeding has the right to testify in his own
defense because he has the textual constitutional right to compel
testimony in his favor, which would seem to include his own testimony, regardless of what common law rules had been, and the
due process right to appear and be heard. Congress has the
power to conscript men and women for the armed forces because
it has the plain-text power to "raise and support armies" and the
53 Why, for example, isn't the exclusionary rule a proper "implementation" of the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures? Amar reserves
peculiar ire for this particular doctrinal emendation of the text (pp 114-16, 172-81), but
his commendable policy arguments against the rule-that it is contrary to the truthseeking function of criminal trials and does not serve to vindicate factual innocence-do
not explain why it could not be considered an allowable (even if suboptimal) doctrinal
sub-rule for implementing the Fourth Amendment's commands.
54 See text accompanying notes 44-45.
55 I have taken (and defended) this position before. See note 45.
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further power to enact measures "necessary and proper" for carrying such power into execution. Brown is right because the
meaning of "equal protection of the laws" excludes government
discrimination based on race. Plessy was wrong because racial
segregation by law violates that rule, not because it chose a
suboptimal subdoctrinal rule. Wrong judicial decisionsdecisions contrary to the meaning of the text-should be overruled because the text controls over faithless decisions departing
from the text.
One can repeat this exercise with Amar's arguments a
number of times, on a number of different issues. Often, the text
supports his conclusions better than his unwritten-ism does.
And it does so in an altogether more straightforward fashion.
One is left with a head-scratching question: Why not just employ
Occam's razor and cut to the chase? Wouldn't it make more
sense, as a matter of interpreting a written constitution, to hold
that the text controls-rather than that the text, as glossed by
unwritten constitutionalism in a variety of indeterminate and
inconsistent ways, does not sufficiently undo the text so as to
warrant the conclusion that the text does not control? Why not
just stick with the text and cut off a couple of extra loops on the
roundabout?
Why go off and write a six-hundred-plus-page ode to an unwritten constitution? Why did the (unwritten) chicken cross the
road?

II. UNTENABLE, UNPRINCIPLED UNWRITTEN-ISM
To get to the other side. The reason Amar embraces unwritten constitutionalism is that the text alone simply does not produce all the results he thinks must be right: it produces some
outcomes that strike him as absurd; it fails to justify our actual
constitutional practice in certain meaningful respects; and it
fails to produce other outcomes Amar thinks important, just,
and good. To avoid such untoward consequences we need to
"read between the lines" (p 31), Amar says. A lot, as it turns out.
That, ultimately, is the motivation that drives the analysis of
many specific issues in this book.
Before I take up a few examples, let me begin by conceding
some ground. First, it is true that the objective linguistic meaning of the Constitution, even when read in context, as a whole,
and giving full credit to its structure and logical inferences, will
sometimes yield unfortunate or undesirable results. Some such
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results may even border on ridiculous--evidence that the Framers
made some mistakes or got some things wrong. This is a genuine
problem with an imperfect written constitution (like ours).56
Amar's solution is to find provisions in an unwritten constitution to correct such undesirable written constitutional outcomes whenever he finds them. But there is a better answer:
recognize that the text occasionally produces unfortunate results
and deal with such flaws directly. If the people judge the Constitution defective they can and should take action to amend the text.
(In extreme cases, they might choose to abandon the written document entirely, as happened with the Articles of Confederation.)57
Let me concede some further ground: it is also true that
some of our actual constitutional practice is in conflict with the
Constitution. There is, perhaps, somewhat less conflict than
many people think. As discussed above, much of our constitutional practice is consistent with *the text of the Constitution,
understood and applied in accordance with sound principles of
original-meaning textual interpretation.58 There is, typically, no
need to resort to roundabout arguments from a supposedly unwritten constitution in order to reach sound and desirable conclusions consistent with much of current practice. And it is often
59
misleading and confusing to do so.

56 See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, Someone Should Have Told Spiro Agnew,
14 Const Commen 245 (1997) (suggesting that, on the basis of the Constitution's text,
the vice president would preside at his own impeachment trial). I take up the "absurdity"
canon and the example of the vice president presiding at his own impeachment trial (an
example Amar makes much of) in Part IV.
57 The project of constitutional correction is best served by reading the Constitution
in a straightforward manner, identifying problematic provisions, and fixing them. That
task is made more difficult by imagining that the text might be read to mean what it
does not say. (What if Madison, Hamilton & Company, rather than writing a new document, had argued that general principles of unwritten constitutionalism implicitly remedied certain defects of the Articles of Confederation, so that it meant something other
than what it said? Would that have done the trick?)
58 See Part I.B.
59 For discussion of results consistent with original-public-meaning textualism, and
refutation of common canards in this regard, see Paulsen, 103 Nw U L Rev at 898-909
(cited in note 1). The Ninth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities and Due Process Clauses, often invoked as archetypes of constitutional indeterminacy, in fact have reasonably specific core meanings if properly interpreted in accordance with the original-public meaning of the text, in context. See id at
884-88, 895-98 (discussing the Ninth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Paulsen, J., Dissenting, in Jack M. Balkin,
ed, What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said: The Nation's Top Legal Experts Rewrite America's
Most ControversialDecision 196, 198-207 (NYU 2005).
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Still, it is true that a fair amount of our accepted constitutional practice today-accepted by some, at least-is not fairly
attributable to the words, phrases, structure, and history of the
constitutional text or to logical inferences fairly derived therefrom. Amar's solution here is less clear. He rejects some of that
practice as simply irreconcilable with the text, but accepts other
parts (notwithstanding its irreconcilability with the text) as a
"gloss" on the text that has become part of our unwritten constitution. Sometimes he accepts the gloss applied by the Supreme
Court. Sometimes he re-glosses the Court's glosses. The choices
of what to gloss, what not to gloss, what glosses to accept as
glossed by the Court, and what glosses to re-gloss, are themselves a form of glossing. It's gloss all the way down.
That is hard to square with the idea of faithfulness to a
written constitution. Once again, there is a better, straightforward
answer: when practice conflicts with the written Constitution, one
should simply acknowledge the conflict. The Constitution supplies
an answer as to what to do in such situations: when practiceincluding judicial precedent-conflicts with the Constitution, the
Constitution's rule is that the Constitution prevails, not the
faithless departure from it.60
Finally, it is true that the text itself will not support many
of the outcomes Amar finds in his unwritten constitution. But
this is as it should be. The Constitution is not an unwritten vessel into which to pour the objects of one's interpretive desires.
And it is precisely on this score that America's Unwritten Constitution is most deeply and seriously flawed. For add up Amar's A
la carte menu of unwritten constitutions-the unwritten "symbolic constitution" (pp 243-76), "feminist constitution" (pp 277306), "lived constitution" (pp 95-138), "doctrinal constitution"
(pp 201-42), "'Warrented' constitution" (pp 139-200)-and it's
off to the races. Amar's unwritten-ism yields unconstrained, unpredictable, unprincipled, untenable, and (literally) unconstitutional outcomes-results that simply cannot be reconciled with
the written constitutional text. Consider just a few examples.
For openers, take Amar's formula for discovering "lived"
unwritten constitutional rights (p 97). Amar reads the Ninth
Amendment as a guarantee of "the people's right to discover and
embrace new rights and to have these new rights respected by
government, so long as the people themselves do indeed claim

60

This is the argument of Marbury, reduced to its essentials. See note 1.
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and celebrate these new rights in their words and/or actions"
(p 108). The content of such rights is "influenced by what the
people believe their rights to be at any given moment" (p 303).61
The Fourteenth Amendment likewise invites courts to "muse
upon the wisdom of ordinary citizens" (pp 119-20). The "privileges and immunities of citizens may be found by paying heed to
citizens-what they do, what they say, what they believe"
(p 120). The document "invites careful consideration of contemporary social meanings and popular understandings" of rights
and liberties (p 304). But that is "not to say that popular social
movements may, as a general matter, amend the Constitution"
(p 296).
If this is not very clear or precise-it isn't-perhaps a numerical formula might help. Amar links the Ninth Amendment to
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and to the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishments and plucks a magic number out of the air: 55 percent.
"A strongly held belief by 55 percent of Americans that they
have a constitutional right against abusive practice Y may suffice
as a textual matter to recognize this right as a truly unenumerated right of 'the people,' a genuine privilege 'of citizens' recognized as such by citizens" (p 136).
Put to one side the not-exactly-clear hedges. (The 55 percent
rule applies to "strongly held" beliefs, with no guidance as to
how to gauge the requisite intensity. And the 55 percent trigger
only "may" suffice to create a new right.) The more basic problem
is that Amar's unwritten Eleven-Twentieths Clause is entirely arbitrary. It does not flow "as a textual matter" from anything
(p 136). It is simply made up. 62
61 As noted above, I have suggested in other writing that the Ninth Amendment
has a clear, straightforward historical meaning as literally a rule of construction forbidding the inference that the Constitution's listing of federal-law rights preempts other
rights derived from other sources of law (such as state law, common law, or natural law).
The Ninth Amendment does not itself create any such rights or vest them with federal
constitutional status, but simply declares that their preexisting legal status is unaltered
by the fact that the US Constitution recognizes certain federal constitutional rights. See
note 59. For elaboration, see Paulsen, 103 Nw U L Rev at 884-88 (cited in note 1);
Paulsen, Book Review, 115 Yale L J at 2046-48 (cited in note 3); Paulsen, Paulsen, J.,
Dissenting at 198 (cited in note 59).
62 John C. Calhoun at least had a reason, even if not a convincing one, for his threefourths ratio for when states' presumptive sovereign right to nullify federal law could be
overridden by the views of other states of the Union: it was the ratio needed to ratify a
constitutional amendment under Article V of the Constitution. See John C. Calhoun, Exposition and Protest, in H. Lee Cheek Jr, ed, John C. Calhoun: Selected Writings and
Speeches 267, 304-05 (Regnery 2003). See also Paulsen, Book Review, 71 U Chi L Rev at
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It is also unprincipled. For no apparent reason, Amar's 55
percent rule works in one direction only. What if public opinion
shifts and 55 percent no longer believe in a right they once valued (written or not)? Is the right now repealed? Amar's answer
is no: such "concern about possible rights diminution is irrelevant" as rights can only "join the existing stock" of rights
(p 136). Once created, they are locked in. But why this should be
so is left unexplained and undefended: Does perceived popular
consensus change our constitutional rights or not?
One is left to speculate that the reason for Amar's one-way
street is to entrench current liberal-elite consensus, at least in
most respects. For example, notwithstanding Amar's 55 percent
rule, there must remain a "lived" constitutional right to abortion
irrespective of popular opposition. (Majorities of 55 percent or
more oppose abortion in most circumstances and have consistently done so since Roe, but Amar does not appear to countenance the prospect of a popularly supported, lived right to life
for the unborn.)63 Amar's made-up exception to his made-up rule
would appear to preclude other popular rights, too, in order to
forestall certain outcomes: If the Constitution otherwise can be
discovered to contain new, 55-percent-majority-approved rights,
why isn't there a (consistently popular) lived constitutional right
to school prayer, or to protect the US flag from desecration? The
reason is the same as the reason for the 55 percent rule in the
first place: Amar has said so. 64

707-08 (cited in note 15). Amar explicitly rejects a three-fourths-of-the-states rule for
recognizing new unwritten rights on the theory that that is the ratio for amending the
Constitution, and judicial recognition of unwritten rights is merely applying the Constitution (p 136). Thus, the 55 percent rule is the one on which he settles (p 136).
63 See note 77. As discussed presently, Amar defends a constitutional right to abortion in the Nineteenth Amendment's rule forbidding sex discrimination in the right to
vote. See text accompanying notes 67-77. Amar argues that such a right exists if women
supporting such a right think it should exist, as they supply the relevant "social meaning" of the Constitution (p 297). See text accompanying note 77 (discussing this position
on its own terms).
64 Amar makes the same claim a bit earlier in the book: "Various new unenumerated
rights are one thing-a perfectly proper thing, thanks in part to these two amendments
[the Ninth and the Fourteenth]. But new limits on ancient rights are something very different, something that the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, rightly read, do not support"
(p 116).
The one-way nature of these rights resembles the one-way nature of new rights flowing
from wrong judicial precedents, discussed above, and is subject to the same criticisms.
See text accompanying notes 45-46. There is no principled metric for deciding when to
recognize such rights, and the premise that rights are self-defining and run in only one
direction is analytically flawed. See text accompanying notes 47-51.

1418

The University of Chicago Law Review

[81:1385

In Amar's view, judges who selectively discover new rights
"are not amending the document" (p 136). "Rather, they are applying it, construing directives in the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments that call for protection of fundamental but nonspecified rights" (p 136). This is proper because the courts, in
creating such rights, would be simply looking for "the same
broad national support for a new right that would warrant a
properly functioning Congress to recognize the right under its
own authority" (p 136). Courts should, in Amar's view, recognize
as constitutionally protected any right that Congress would have
had the power to enact and ought to have enacted, but did not.
What might these rights be? Some concrete examples illustrate Amar's thinking. Here's my personal favorite: the Ninth
Amendment (or perhaps the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment), with an assist from the Fourth
Amendment's protection from unreasonable searches of people's
"houses," apparently confers a lived-right constitutional entitlement to the home-mortgage-interest deduction from income taxes
(p 129). I am not making this up. Amar is a bit cagey in how he
puts this, but there it is, in his discussion of judicial recognition
of lived, popular rights believed in and claimed by the American
people:
[F]ederal facilitation of the home-mortgage market and federal tax deductions of home-mortgage interest payments
and of local property taxes [] are virtually untouchable politically, and in this respect resemble relatively clear constitutional texts that place particular issues politically off-limits.
...True, nothing in the written Constitution explicitly demands special protection of "houses" or "privacy," but surely
the document invites judges (and other interpreters) to attend to this explicit word and this implicit concept in pondering which unenumerated rights are properly claimed by
the people. (p 129)
In fairness, Amar does not quite say that judges must recognize
such a home-mortgage-interest-deduction constitutional right;
the document simply invites such action. Similarly, there is at
least a potentially recognizable unwritten constitutional right to
Social Security benefits, because these too "are politically entrenched in modern America for similar reasons" (p 129).
Some of the other rights that Amar says have "bloomed profusely" (p 116) may be more familiar in today's constitutional
discourse. But Amar's arguments are not familiar. Take, for
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example, his argument for why gay sex is a right discoverable in
the unwritten constitution. Amar's argument here consists of a
cringe-worthy pun on satirical remarks in a 1787 newspaper article in which the writer was mocking the Anti-Federalists' objection to the Constitution's lack of a bill of rights. The Ninth
Amendment should be taken in general to mean what the newspaper satirist was scoffing at, Amar argues. Specifically, the
Ninth Amendment encompasses a right to gay sex acts, by analogy
to the satirist's reference to the need to specify rights of "eating
and drinking" (pp 124-26).
Here's Amar's full argument in three easy steps. First: The
Ninth Amendment embodies America's "lived experience" and
that experience values the home (p 124). We should therefore
read the Fourth Amendment's restrictions on searches through
this lens and give them added heft by virtue of the Ninth
Amendment (pp 124, 128)..
Second: In a newspaper submission in 1787, Noah Webster,
a Federalist supporter of the proposed new Constitution (but not
a framer or ratifier of either the original document or its early
amendments) spoofed Anti-Federalist objections that the Constitution did not contain a list of enumerated rights. Webster proposed the following faux amendment: "That Congress shall never
restrain any inhabitant of America from eating and drinking, at
seasonable times, or prevent his lying on his left side, in a long
winter's night, or even on his back, when he is fatigued by lying
on his right" (p 125).
Third: Webster's 1787 reductio ad absurdum should be taken
to illustrate the unwritten meaning of the Ninth Amendment,
proposed some two years later (and in which Webster seems to
have had no direct role65). Webster's jest is incorporated by the
Ninth Amendment as a gloss on the Fourth Amendment, protecting freedom in the home. (Why this intermediate step is
needed is unclear.) Therefore, Webster's satire demonstrates the
existence of an unwritten constitutional right to engage in
whatever private sexual acts one chooses with whomever one
wishes.

65 Noah Webster was not a member of the First Congress or of any body that voted
on the ratification of the amendments proposed by the First Congress, now understood to
comprise America's Bill of Rights. He wrote a pamphlet endorsing ratification of the
Constitution. See generally Noah Webster, An Examination into the Leading Principles
of the Federal Constitution(Prichard & Hall 1787).
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Here's Amar's punch line:
True, governments have generally not regulated on which
side a man may lie in his own bed or when he must rise
from that bed. But governments have at times tried to dictate with whom he may lie in that bed and have also tried to
outlaw certain physical positions in that bed. Contrary to
Webster's sanguine expectations, governments have also
sought to regulate what persons may place in their
mouths-perhaps not with intrusive rules about "eating and
drinking," but rather with detailed dictates about which
body parts of fully consenting adults may not lawfully be
brought into oral contact. (pp 125-26)
Get it? Oral sex is like "eating"or "drinking."Choosing one's
sexual partners or sex acts is like sleeping on the "side" one
prefers.
As constitutional analysis, this is of course ludicrous. Of all
the arguments that one could make for the asserted rights in
question-sexual-liberty rights in general, gay rights in particu66
lar-this is the oddest and least persuasive I have ever seen.
Take another example: Amar argues that the Nineteenth
Amendment's guarantee of the right of women to vote creates a
constitutional right to abortion.67 Here is how his argument unfolds: the Nineteenth Amendment guarantees women not only
the right to vote in state and federal elections (p 286) but also a
correlative right of women to hold elected office and serve on juries
(pp 287-89).
66 This is the point that Amar is trying to establish. Three pages earlier he discusses
Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558 (2003), (p 122) (referring to Lawrence as a "soaring philosophical ode to liberty and equality").
The correct answer is that the Constitution simply does not specify such a right, but,
for better or worse, leaves such matters to the good (or bad) judgment of representative
bodies that may seek to regulate private sexual (or other) conduct in the home if they
consider it appropriate to do so. For all the Constitution says, government-state government, at least-may regulate eating, drinking, smoking or other ingestion of certain
substances, and even sleeping or other private activity, in the home, if it chooses to do so.
Such power admits of the possible enactment and enforcement of many potentially ridiculous laws, but that does not render such laws unconstitutional.
67 The argument comes in the second half of Chapter Seven, entitled "'Remembering the Ladies': America's Feminist Constitution" (pp 277-306). The abortion argument
comes later (pp 291-306). The argument as presented in this chapter of America's Unwritten Constitution is vague and a bit cagey, but it is essentially the same argument
that Amar presented in an earlier essay. See Akhil Reed Amar, Amar, J., Concurringin
the Judgment in Part and Dissenting in Part in Roe v. Wade, No. 70-18, and Dissenting
in Doe v. Bolton, No. 70-40, in Balkin, ed, What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said 152,
160-68 (cited in note 59).
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This much is probably within fair textual-interpretive
bounds: a decent (if not quite unavoidable) whole-text, originalmeaning argument can be made that jury service and office
holding are rights conceptually and historically linked to the
franchise and embraced by it, and Amar makes just such a point
8
(p 288).6
But then Amar takes a giant leap to the abstract principle
that America therefore has an unwritten "Feminist Constitution" that can be read to stand for a great many other things
(pp 277, 286-87). This is the oldest and lamest lawyer's trick in
the book: take the words of a legal text, wave your hand and announce that the words stand for some "broader principle," formulate the principle as you will (making sure that it's broad
enough to embrace the words of the text, but plenty more besides), then reread the text as if it contained the principle rather
than the words. It is hard to think of a more transparent ruse
than saying that the Nineteenth Amendment woman's suffrage
guarantee stands for an amorphous principle of an unwritten
Feminist Constitution, and then investing that constitution with
whatever content one thinks goes along with feminism.
What does Amar's Feminist Constitution embrace? For one
thing, it adopts the not-adopted Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA). This is because the ERA was "a largely declaratory proposal" (pp 295-96)-a statement that surely would have come as
news to those nearly three-fourths of the states that thought
they were ratifying a constitutional text that would have meaning and effect, and to the just over one-fourth of the states that
69
rejected the amendment for exactly that reason.
The real agenda, however, appears to be finding an alternative roost for a constitutional right to contraception (to justify
the outcome in Griswold v Connecticut7) and to abortion (to justify

68 Again, however, there may be a more straight-line path to this result. The Equal
Protection Clause specifies that no state may deny equal protection of the law to "any
person within its jurisdiction." US Const Amend XIV. Women are persons, obviously.
The dictates of the Equal Protection Clause thus apply to sex-based legal classifications,
including state classifications with respect to jury service and the protection of jury trial.
Consider Strauder v West Virginia, 100 US 303, 308-09 (1879) (holding that the equal
right of all members of the political community to serve on juries is within Congress's
power to enforce the equal protection of the laws).
69 Does the now-magically-adopted ERA have bite or not? What's the point of Amar's
exercise if the ERA adds nothing but verbiage?
70
381 US 479 (1965).
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the outcome in Roe). Here is where the chain of reasoning becomes unbearably strained.
First, Amar posits, the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment presumptively invalidated all pre-1920 laws adopted by
all-male Congresses and state legislatures that affect women in
identifiable ways (pp 291-92). Because such laws were adopted
by legislatures under what Amar argues should be regarded-by
virtue of the subsequent adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment-as an illegitimate political process from which half the
rightful electorate was excluded, all such laws should be deemed
retroactively vacated. Poop
To say that this is a creative proposition is something of an
understatement. The text of the Nineteenth Amendment reads
as a purely prospective prohibition of state or federal denial of
voting (and perhaps allied) rights to women: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of sex." This
prohibition comes with a purely prospective grant of legislative
power to Congress to enforce this equal right to vote: "Congress
shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." The Nineteenth Amendment does not retroactively do anything; it does not retroactively confer voting rights, let alone
retroactively scotch selected laws. Tellingly, Amar nowhere
quotes the language of the Nineteenth Amendment itself. Instead, he latches onto what he asserts to be its unwritten "underlying logic" (p 282) (emphasis omitted).
Amar's absurd starting premise forces him to craft an
enormous exception taking back some of the absurdity: not all
pre-1920 legal enactments are invalid, because that would make
the Nineteenth Amendment itself unconstitutional (to say nothing of the entire original Constitution, Bill of Rights, and Reconstruction Amendments). Rather, the Nineteenth Amendment
right to vote invalidates only pre-1920 laws that burden women
in specific ways, on account of such laws having been adopted by
(retroactively) unconstitutional all-male legislatures (pp 29394). The Nineteenth Amendment is thus the fount of a principle
invalidating pre-1920, gender-discriminatory laws (pp 292-93).
This, Amar then concludes, establishes the existence of a constitutional right to abortion-at least as against pre-1920 lawsbecause restricting abortion burdens women (p 292).
This is an odd recycling, in Nineteenth Amendment form, of
a tired argument usually cast in terms of the Equal Protection
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Clause. The assertion is that abortion restrictions discriminate
on the basis of sex because only women become pregnant.7 1 That
claim is obviously superficial and specious, however. Abortion
restrictions do not regulate on the basis of sex-that is, they do
not regulate women because they are women-but on the basis
of pregnancy and the asserted need to protect another human
life, present in the womb. Whatever one thinks of such a moral
or policy view, abortion restrictions are not gender based. They
restrict the conduct of one subclass of women-those who desire
abortions-but they do not regulate women as a class, and they
regulate the conduct of men with respect to abortion, too.72 The
sex-discrimination/equal protection argument for abortion rights
fails as a matter of straightforward discrimination-law principles. 73 (Indeed, a sad irony is that the argument for abortion
rights on grounds of "women's equality" ends up justifying a constitutional right to abortion of human females for being female.)74
The Nineteenth Amendment gambit has yet further problems-problems that lead Amar yet further away from the text.
Amar's argument so far leads to the (already dubious) conclusion that abortion laws adopted by all-male legislatures, elected
under pre-Nineteenth Amendment voting rules, are unconstitutional (p 292). That only gets him so far: 1920 was a long time
ago. What about abortion restrictions enacted after 1920? Even
under Amar's Nineteenth Amendment partial retroactivity principle, modern abortion restrictions should be constitutional,
shouldn't they?
71 See Anita L. Allen, The Proposed Equal Protection Fix for Abortion Law: Reflections on Citizenship, Gender, and the Constitution, 18 Harv J L & Pub Pol 419, 435-39
(1995); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to
Roe v. Wade, 63 NC L Rev 375, 382-83 (1985). For a powerful recent refutation of this
sex discrimination argument from a different feminist perspective, see generally Erika
Bachiochi, Embodied Equality: Debunking Equal Protection Arguments for Abortion
Rights, 34 Harv J L & Pub Pol 889 (2011). It is difficult to see how the sex discrimination
argument is improved in the slightest by transposing it from the Equal Protection
Clause to the seemingly even less apt key of the Nineteenth Amendment right to vote.
72 See Bray v Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 US 263, 267-74 (1993) (stating
that action predicated on opposition to abortion is not gender-based "discrimination");
Geduldig v Aiello, 417 US 484, 494-97 & n 20 (1974) (holding that classification based on
pregnancy is not sex-based classification subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause).
73 For further discussion of these points, see generally Bachiochi, 34 Harv J L &
Pub Pol 889 (cited in note 71). See also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional
Decision of All Time, 78 Notre Dame L Rev 995, 1009 n 35 (2003).
74 See Paulsen, 78 Notre Dame L Rev at 1009 n 35 (cited in note 73); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, It's a Girl (Public Discourse Oct 24, 2011), online at http://www.thepublicdiscourse
.comI2011/10/4149 (visited Aug 12, 2014).
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To avoid this result, Amar argues (and has argued for more
than a decade) that newer abortion restrictions are invalid under
the Nineteenth Amendment--even after equal suffrage, even if
supported by a majority of women-because pregnancy and
childbirth make political participationmore difficult and therefore violate the Nineteenth Amendment right to vote. 75 Amar evidently intends this argument to be taken seriously. He repeats it
in this book (p292) but shies away, slightly, from stating it quite
as overtly as he has before, instead voicing it through his fictitious, feminist alter ego character, "Eve," engaged in an imagined
debate with the awful male chauvinist "Adam" (pp 297-302).76 But
in the end, Amar sticks to his outrageous claim: abortion restrictions in force today, ninety-plus years after the constitutional grant of equal women's suffrage, violate the Nineteenth
Amendment right to vote and the Feminist Constitution unwritten
between the lines.
If that isn't fully persuasive-Amar seemingly recognizes
that it isn't (p 302)-he offers a fallback proposition that blithely
abandons text, logic, and principle altogether: "Where pure logic

75 See, for example, Amar, Amar, J., Concurringat 166 (cited in note 67) (arguing
that some laws "continue[ ] to impose serious and gender-specific burdens on women...
that, by disrupting women's lives and careers, may make it less likely that they will be
able to be full political equals in legislatures, judiciaries, and other positions of government power").
76 Adam denied that laws restricting or prohibiting abortion discriminate on the
basis of sex and argued that these laws simply treat pregnancy differently because of the
different reality created by the fact of pregnancy (including, obviously, the existence of a
new human embryonic life) (p 298). Eve's rejoinder speaks for Amar here and presents
his Nineteenth Amendment argument:

Adam, you can't really mean that last point. Surely government should not be
free to subordinate women so long as it does so via laws that use women's
unique biology to disadvantage them as a class! Imagine, for example, a law
that said pregnant people may not vote, or serve on juries, or be elected to office. Wouldn't such a law plainly violate the Nineteenth Amendment? If so,
isn't this a square admission that laws heaping disabilities on pregnant persons as such are indeed laws discriminating "on account of sex"? (p 300)
Amar wrote nearly identical words in a hypothetical alternative abortion-rights opinion
in Roe by "Justice Amar" ten years ago:
Surely, government should not be free to subordinate women so long as it does
so via laws that use women's unique biology to disadvantage them as a class.
Imagine, for example, a law that said that pregnant people cannot vote, or
cannot serve on juries, or be elected to office. Would not such a law plainly violate the Nineteenth Amendment? But, if so, isn't this a square admission that
laws that heap disabilities on pregnant persons are indeed laws that discriminate "on account of sex"?
Amar, Amar, J., Concurringat 164 (cited in note 67).
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runs out, social meaning often fills the gap to complete the circle
of proper constitutional analysis" (p 302) (emphasis added). Talk
about (literally) circular reasoning! If the text does not specify a
desired result, and if logic does not yield it either, "social meaning" can supply the preferred outcome by supplying all of the
missing steps. And the relevant "social meaning of contraception
and abortion laws" is to be found "in the eyes of women themselves" (p 297)-or at least in the eyes of those who support
abortion: abortion laws are unconstitutional because they are so
viewed by those women who support abortion rights (as it turns
out, a minority of women).77 The fact that the written text does
not contain any such rule does not really matter: "Whether or
not the written Constitution compels this feminist rule of construction, this approach redeems the document's deepest principles"
(p 305).

What is one to do with all this? In each of the instances described-a 55 percent formula for new, one-way-street lived
rights; the claimed unwritten constitutional right to mortgageinterest deductions; an all-purpose Ninth Amendment; gay
rights by analogy to eating and drinking; a Nineteenth Amendment right to abortion because pregnancy makes it harder for
women to vote-Amar's unwritten-ism becomes practically a
parody of itself. As noted above, in many instances it generates
an utterly unnecessary excursion. In many others, it appears to
license a silly, child's wordplay game that anyone can play and
that can produce practically any desired result. As a matter of
analysis of the actual Constitution, this is wholly indefensible.
With distressing frequency, Amar's reasoning appears rather
transparently, even embarrassingly, result-oriented. One need

77 As far as relevant "social meaning" goes, it turns out empirically that women are
decidedly more pro-life (or anti-abortion) than men: most women oppose most abortions.
Indeed, the most consistently pro-abortion-rights demographic group is (perhaps not entirely surprisingly) young males. For a collection of the relevant studies, see Clarke D.
Forsythe, Abuse of Discretion: The Inside Story of Roe v. Wade 305 & n 32, 332-33
(Encounter 2013). For analysis, see Richard Stith, Her Choice, Her Problem: How Abortion Empowers Men (First Things Aug/Sept 2009), online at http://www.firstthings.com
article/2009/07/her-choice-her-problem (visited Aug 12, 2014). Amar's "social meaning"
argument is strange indeed. Only if one defines the relevant social meaning as that expressed by persons who agree with your position-"to complete the circle of proper constitutional analysis" (p 302)--can one disregard the position of the majority of women as
part of the relevant social meaning.
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not work very hard to imagine slippery slope scenarios of what a
willful interpreter might do with the unwritten constitution described by Amar. Akhil Amar races to the bottom of the slope
straightaway.
III. ROGER TANEY WOULD HAVE LOVED THIS BOOK
The problem is not only with the specific untenable results
that Amar reaches. It is that an interpretive method that can
yield these results can yield any result. Amar's unwritten-ism is
so malleable, so unmoored from the text, that it allows practitioners of it to reach almost any conclusion they want, including
some fairly hideous ones.
We have already looked at Plessy: if the unwritten constitution permits judges to fill in, with doctrines of their devising,
perceived gaps in unspecific texts, and promulgate such doctrines as if they were constitutional rules, there is no sound and
sure basis for saying that Plessy was wrong, and no secure justification for not according it stare decisis effect as precedent78
Simply put, if unwritten-ism is right, Plessy was not wrong.
Nothing in Amar's interpretive methodology-as opposed to his
simple declaration to the contrary (p 273)79-forecloses such a
result.
The same could be said for that granddaddy of judicial
atrocities, the Supreme Court's 1857 decision in Dred Scott.
Amar himself denies this, but, again, there is nothing in his articulated methodology that actually forecloses such a result and
a great deal that could be used to support it.
You be the judge. I offer here an unwrittenconstitutionalism, reading-between-the-lines argument for the
conclusions in Chief Justice Roger Taney's infamous opinion in
Dred Scott, making straightforward use of Amar's methodological toolkit:

See text accompanying note 42.
In his chapter on the "Symbolic Constitution," Amar says that Plessy "disregarded the rather plain facts that: (1) the written Constitution promised that blacks would be
treated as equal citizens, and (2) the whole point of Jim Crow was to deny black equalityto treat blacks as inferior" (p 273). He then offers a conclusory observation that, taken
seriously, seems to walk back everything else he says in the book: "This judicial disregard cannot be justified by appealing to some vague notion of an 'unwritten Constitution'
that must be given its due" (p 273). It is difficult to know what to make of this. It is either an obligatory, defensive hedge, or a simple self-contradiction. See also p 149 (making a passing remark that the Court "wrongly upheld segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson").
78
79
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While the text of the Constitution (circa 1857) did not explicitly
grant a constitutional right to own black slaves, free of federal intrusion, such a right was implicit in the provisions that the document did contain with respect to slavery. Reading between the
lines, we can see this rather clearly: the Constitution affirmatively
protected slavery in undeniable ways. It provided an absolute constitutional right to recapture fugitive slaves, trumping state laws
prohibiting slavery. It protected the right to import slaves for the
first twenty years under the new Constitution-the first individual
"constitutional right" in the Constitution.8 0 It provided enhanced
representation, and political power, for slave states, to the tune of
three-fifths of a vote per head of slave chattel. It is simply absurd
(is it not?) to think that this did not mean that the Constitution
implicitly recognized an affirmative constitutional right to own
slave property. It is simply absurd (is it not?) to think that the national government could then turn around and ban such constitutionally protected property ownership in federal territories.
This result is confirmed by our unwritten "enacted" constitution: the very fact of adoption of these new, slavery-reinforcing
provisions into the new Constitution shows that this is what "We
the People" wanted-an enacted proslavery constitutionS1 This
result is also confirmed by our unwritten 'lived" constitution: for
threescore and ten years, the written Constitution had been understood and applied, repeatedly and consistently, to preserve,
protect, and extend the legal right to the institution of slavery.
Both congressional practice and the "doctrinal" judicial constitu82
tion of precedent merged in support of this lived consensus.
The text may have been, slightly, underspecified with respect
to slave-owners' full rights, but it is a fully appropriate part of the
judicial role to fill in these interstices. Thus, while Article IV of
the Constitution, which specifies the power of the national government to admit new states and legislate for the territories,
might not explicitly say that such territories are the common
property of all the current states of the union, or that newly
formed states must have the full equal rights of existing ones,
surely that is the un-written message between the lines. It follows
that existing slave states must have the equal right to transport

US Const Art I,§ 9, cl 1.
For a powerful demonstration that the act of adopting the new Constitution introduced new proslavery fundamental national law, going beyond the Articles of Confederation,
see Amar, America's Constitution:A Biography at 20-21, 256-57, 473 (cited in note 2).
82 See id at 113, 119-20, 260-64.
80
81
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their social and economic institutions to federal territories; that
newly admitted states formed from those territories must possess
the equal constitutional right to be admitted as slave states; and
that the national government, in its temporary guardianship of
the common territory of the nation, must take no action to interfere with such right to extend the institution of slavery, in accordance with the will of the people in any national territory or new
state, under Article IV.
Moreover, the Fifth Amendment's prohibitions on the national
government depriving anyone of property without due process of
law, or of "taking" property without just compensation, forbid-at
least implicitly, if not quite explicitly-national laws restricting
the travel, transfer, or alienation of constitutionally protected
property such as human slaves. Could anyone really fairly say
that a law of the nation depriving a man of his property for the offense of travelling with that property to the common territory of
the nation could be deemed consistent with the notion of "due pro83
cess of law"?
Finally, this right to own and take one's constitutionally recognized property in slaves to federal territories, immune from interference by the national government, is reinforced by perhaps the
most comprehensive constitutional protection of all: the Ninth
Amendment-a text that seems positively to direct us to look outside the text, to preconstitutional and "natural" rights, to fill in
the "gaps" of what the text explicitly says with the rights we know
simply must be included as well.84 The Ninth Amendment, especially in light of all the other proslavery provisions in the Constitution, means that it literally went without saying that the national government could not interfere with the right to own slave
property and take it with you wherever you went throughout the
nation. One would no more need to say so specifically than one
would need to recite that a man can change sleeping positions or
decide what to eat or otherwise put in his mouth. The right to own
slaves, recognized in the Constitution, was clearly a preconstitutional right of the people of every state. Because the text did not

83 The arguments of the two preceding paragraphs track-fairly closely-standard
Southern arguments at the time for the right to bring slaves into the "common property"
of the nation and Taney's argument in Dred Scott for the unconstitutionality of the Missouri
Compromise's prohibition of slavery in certain Northern territories. Dred Scott, 60 US at
434-39, 450. They are simply expressed here in the terms of Amar's various unwritten
constitutions.
84 Compare with Amar's discussion (pp 97-138).
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withdraw it specifically, the unwritten constitution (and the written Ninth Amendment) necessarily preserves it inviolate.
Slavery was initially, of course, an integral part of America's
"symbolic" constitution.8 5 The men who wrote the Declaration of
Independence in 1776 recognized and accepted the institution of
human chattel slavery based on race. It is thus part of the background understanding of American democracy and constitutionalism. It is impossible to believe that those men could have understood the right to own slaves as anything other than one of those
self-evident inalienable rights of property not rightfully within the
power of government to limit or restrict. These men were not hypocrites. They understood that the principles that they were declaring were principles governing free, white men. They did not say it
in quite those terms, but it is written between the lines of the Declaration of Independence, every bit as much it is written between
86
the lines of the Constitution.
And while we're at it: Could a state law, forbidding a fellow
citizen of the nation from travelling with his constitutionally protected property to that state, truly be thought consonant with Article IV's Comity Clause, which commands reciprocal recognition
of basic rights by every state of the union for the citizens of every
other state? The Privileges and Immunities Clause-the Comity
Clause-might not explicitly say that, precisely, but the whole
idea, written in the sticky hidden ink between the words of the
written text of this fundamental provision cementing us together
as a nation, is that the citizens of slave states must find their constitutional property rights respected in the other states of the union.
How could it be otherwise and still preserve a "more perfect Union,"
as the Preamble of the Constitution so augustly proclaims?
It follows from all this that the Constitution clearly and unavoidably recognizes a constitutional right to own blacks as slave
property, a right immune from federal interference or prohibition
in the states where it exists, a right that extends to common property of the union without discrimination against citizens of slave
states, and a right that extends to every state of the union by virtue of the rights that citizens of slave states carry with them
throughout that union of states. It follows, then, that Dred Scott
was rightly decided in its core holdings: that blacks, the race suited
85

Compare with Amar's discussion (pp 245-75).
Taney's opinion makes essentially this same argument from the symbolic force of
iconic American nonconstitutional texts like the Declaration of Independence. See Dred
Scott, 63 US at 407-12.
86
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for slavery and not citizenship, cannot sue as citizens in the courts
of the United States; that the Missouri Compromise, which purported to abolish slavery in certain territories of the United
States, is an unconstitutional denial of the rights of property and
equality of slave owners; and that the same right to slavery extends to require so-called "free states" to recognize the right to
slavery conferred by the laws of their sister states.
Is this absurd and outrageous? Not at all-not if Amar's
methodology is appropriate. Indeed, I submit that these arguments are far less of a stretch, far less extravagant and implausible, than some of Amar's arguments for the unwritten constitutional rights he finds. (A Nineteenth Amendment right to
abortion comes to mind,87 as does his Ninth Amendment-Fourth
Amendment argument for various sexual-liberty claimsss and for
the lived-right entitlement to the mortgage-interest tax deduction.89) Amar's methodology, if widely accepted, would have given
Taney quite a hand.
Dred Scott was wrong-on all of the points on which I have
attempted to enlist Amar's approaches in its behalf. But it is
wrong only if one rejects Amar's arsenal of interpretive weapons
and instead adheres, in a reasonably strict fashion, to the
original linguistic meaning of the constitutional text: the national government has power to legislate for the territories (and
state-law-conferred rights do not control federal-governance
choices); the text's slavery protections extend only as far as their
words' meanings provide and do not properly provide a springboard for more; it is not the job of courts to fill in perceived
"gaps" in the text, but the right of the people, acting through
representative institutions, to legislate policy, within the scope
of enumerated powers, in whatever interstices remain after the
text's specification of individual rights; the Ninth Amendment
is, literally, a rule of construction about the (non)effect of listing
other rights in a bill of rights (doing so does not rescind statelaw or common law rights), not a blank check for judicial writing
of new, unwritten federal constitutional rights; and the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment plainly does not confer

87
88

89

See text accompanying notes 68-77.
See text accompanying notes 65-66.
See pp 1420-21.
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(unwritten) substantive rights to be discovered and applied by
the judiciary.90
Amar of course thinks that Dred Scott was wrongly decidedone of three Supreme Court opinions rightly thought to "occupy
the lowest circle of constitutional Hell" (p 270).91 But that is not
really the point. The point is that, in the wrong hands-in the
hands of any even reasonably skillful player intent on reaching
a predetermined outcome-Amar's unwritten constitution admits
of virtually any result. Give me Amar's interpretive methodology
as a lever and a place to stand, and I can move the constitutional
world.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL RULES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTION

Still, Amar does have a fair point. In fact, he has a number
of them. First, the text of the Constitution, understood according
to the original linguistic meaning of its words and phrases, does
not always supply determinate answers to important questions.
There is ambiguity, there is indeterminacy, and there is uncertainty as to proper application of the text. What does one do in
these situations? Second, there is the lurking specter of absurdity:
sometimes the text, on its own, appears to permit or even require foolish outcomes; only by indulging background premises
90 Justice Benjamin Curtis's dissent in Dred Scott puts the point perfectly and succinctly-and also serves as a fitting critique of the consequences of Amar's thesis:
[W]hen a strict interpretation of the Constitution, according to the fixed rules
which govern the interpretation of laws, is abandoned, and the theoretical
opinions of individuals are allowed to control its meaning, we have no longer a
Constitution; we are under the government of individual men, who for the time
being have power to declare what the Constitution is, according to their own
views of what it ought to mean.
Dred Scott, 60 US at 621 (Curtis dissenting).
91 Amar calls Dred Scott a "preposterous garbling of the Constitution as that document was publicly understood when ratified" (p 271). (He appears not to recognize the
irony of this condemnation in light of arguments for a Nineteenth Amendment right to
abortion and a Fourth Amendment-Ninth Amendment argument for a right to the homemortgage interest deduction.) Plessy, 163 US 537, and Lochner v New York, 198 US 45
(1905), are the two other cases in Amar's Unholy Trinity (pp 270, 273-74). His brief discussion of why he thinks these cases are wrong comes in his chapter on the so-called
Symbolic Constitution. These cases have become negative icons (pp 270-74). "Each case
presents an example of unwritten constitutionalism run amok, and thus powerfully reminds us of the need to place principled limits on judges who venture beyond the text
and original understanding of the written Constitution" (p 270). Exactly. The problem,
however, is that Amar's unwritten-ism imposes no such principled limits and could just
as well justify these negative icons as condemn them.
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not specified in the literal text, or by adopting an interpretive
canon of seeking to avoid absurdity, can we make good practical
sense of the text. Third, there is the problem, already noted, of
incongruity between literal text and actual practice: a considerable
amount of our practice under the Constitution, of judicial precedent interpreting it, of the nation's lived experience in implementing it, and of popular sentiment concerning it, simply does
not square very well with the original meaning of the document
itself. What does one do when textual meaning runs out (as it
always does, eventually) or runs into trouble (as it does with
enough regularity to be troubling)? What does one do with ambiguity, indeterminacy, uncertainty, absurdity, and incongruity?
It has become common in recent constitutional scholarship
to distinguish "interpretation" of the text-the attempt to discern objective linguistic textual meaning-and "construction,"
the enterprise of applying the text's meaning.92 (I somewhat prefer the terms "exegesis" and "hermeneutics" to capture this distinction-terms customarily used in scholarly discourse concerning interpretation of biblical and other types of literature.
Though more technical and fancy-sounding, exegesis and hermeneutics convey the same intended meaning, presumably, but
are less vague, ambiguous, and subject to manipulation than
9
"interpretation" and "construction." 3)
There is always, inevitably, some "construction zone" (to
borrow Professor Larry Solum's wonderfully felicitous term)94:
the hermeneutic task of deciding how to bring the meaning of

92 See, for example, Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-ConstructionDistinction,
27 Const Commen 95, 100-08 (2010); Randy E. Barnett, Interpretationand Construction,
34 Harv J L & Pub Pol 65, 69-70 (2011).
93 The word "construction" is both vague and ambiguous: in common usage it has a
connotation fairly close to "interpretation"-as in "construing" the text-which can create confusion over what are in theory discrete tasks; moreover, "construction" also has
connotations of "creating" or "building" something, which gives constitutional construction
a slight aura of allowable malleability, even creativity. In short, the term "construction"
tends to be something of a mash-up, conflating textual interpretation with a certain
freedom--even willfulness-in the task of applying the text to a specific problem or situation. (A former faculty colleague of mine at the University of Minnesota Law School
once had on his door a copy of an amusing typographical error, or unwitting misquote, of
M'Culloch, from a brief in an actual case, rendering John Marshall's statement as 'We
must never forget that it is a Constitutionwe are expanding.")
94 Lawrence B. Solum, Originalismand ConstitutionalConstruction, 82 Fordham L
Rev 453, 458 (2013). But note how the term's charm in part lies in that it is a play on
words-that it makes use of the fact that the word "construction" has dual meanings and
may to that extent be ambiguous. Literal "construction zones" involve building, making,
or repairing something. (They are not "construing" zones.)
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the text to bear on the situation at hand. Meaning gets you only
so far. You then have to decide what to do with that meaning
once you have found it.
Sometimes the construction zone is small, because the text
is clear and its application to the problem at hand is straightforward, so that the only hermeneutic decision is the decision
whether or not to be governed by the meaning of the written
constitutional text in a straightforward fashion. Sometimes the
construction zone at least appears larger than this, however, because the text is vague, ambiguous, or in some other fashion
bears a range of meaning. The hermeneutic question is what one
should do with such texts. What principles should direct those
called upon to apply the written text to the practical task of governance, where the text is in some fashion or to some degree indeterminate, and should those principles be different for different institutional actors?
A few years back I wrote an article entitled Does the Consti91 My answer
tution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?
was yes: the Constitution contains explicit and implicit general,
global interpretive instructions for how to ascertain, faithfully,
the meaning of the Constitution's words; 96 the document also
contains a surprising number of specific interpretive instructions concerning the proper way to understand the meaning of
specific provisions. 97 I did not draw a crisp distinction between
instructions concerning faithful constitutional interpretation
(the task of textual exegesis) and instructions concerning constitutional construction (the hermeneutic task of appropriating and
applying texts' meaning on the ground, so to speak). Perhaps I
should have, for in some sense that is a distinct question. The
Constitution's core instruction with respect to interpretationis
that the words and phrases of the document should be accorded
their original meaning, in context; that is how to understand
what the text says. 98 Does the Constitution also specify, or imply, rules for its application? It might not make for a catchy
article title, but maybe I should have posed as a separate question: "Does the Constitution Prescribe Hermeneutic Principles
Paulsen, 103 Nw U L Rev at 857 (cited in note 1).
Id at 864-72.
97 Id at 884-93.
98 That is the position I defend in Does the ConstitutionPrescribeRules for Its Own
Interpretation? Paulsen, 103 Nw U L Rev at 920-21 (cited in note 1). In that article I
sometimes address, implicitly or explicitly, questions of "construction," or application, of
the document. Id at 858.
95
96
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for Applying Textual Meaning to the Practical Tasks of Constitutional Governance and Adjudication of Cases by Courts?"
Akhil Amar's answer is no: this is all up for grabs, the text
is indeterminate, the resulting construction zone is vast, and the
room for intellectual play within the construction zone is essentially limitless. Because construction is inevitable, at least to
some degree, and because there have always been some recognized rules of construction in law-the rule against absurdity,99
for example-we therefore have an unwritten constitution. The
logical leap to "anything (clever) goes" is an enormous one, of
course, and the enormous problems with Amar's book demonstrate the hazards of taking such a leap with no textual net.
I would like to suggest a different general answer. To be
sure, construction is inevitable to some degree. But written constitutionalism itself strongly suggests, and our specific written
Constitution confirms, that there are meaningful boundaries on
any such construction projects. These boundaries are not imported
from outside the text but are implicit in the text, structure, and
logic of the document itself. Put differently, the Constitution
supplies not only interpretive instructions-rules directed toward
correctly ascertaining textual meaning-but also hermeneutic
principles constraining what faithful appliers (of various kinds)
properly can do with that meaning, and what they should do
when that meaning runs out. Here are a few such hermeneutic
principles:
First, the whole project of written constitutionalism is, as it
were, construction-reduction:the purpose of reducing decisions
to writing is to reduce decisions. Those decisions made by the
Constitution are settled and binding. That is a rule of construction of sorts-it is a hermeneutic rule that, when exegesis of the
text supplies an applicable rule of law, that rule must be followed as a rule of governance. This rule of construction, however,
is plainly one that is warranted by the text. The Supremacy
Clause of Article VI specifies that "[tihis Constitution ... shall
be the supreme Law of the Land."100 The Supremacy Clause is
most naturally read as supplying a simple hermeneutic rule for

99 See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 60, 91 (Chicago
1979) ("[T]he rule is, where words bear either none, or a very absurd signification, if literally understood, we must a little deviate from the received sense of them."). Amar discusses the rule against absurdity in particular (pp 7-9).
100 US Const Art VI, cI 2.
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applying our written Constitution: where the Constitution supplies a rule, that rule governs.
This hermeneutic rule is reinforced, in the very same sentence of Article VI, by what appears to be a rather specific hermeneutic directive to judges to treat the meaning of the document, once ascertained according to correct principles of
interpretation, as binding in their application of it to specific
cases: the text specifies that the "Judges in every State" shall be
"bound thereby," notwithstanding any possibly inconsistent state
law.101 And immediately after that, the Constitution prescribes
that all government officials swear an oath to support "this Constitution" (including its Supremacy Clause),102 a provision that
would appear to offer at least some further evidence supporting
a hermeneutic principle of direct-and-binding application of the
Constitution's meaning, once properly ascertained, to all tasks of
governance for which it supplies a rule. In short, if we purport to
be governed by a written constitution-a political decision extrinsic to the text-then that written constitution says that the
written constitution is supreme governing law binding on those
who invoke its authority. That is the first core rule of constitutional "construction": where the Constitution supplies a determinate rule, that rule governs.
Second, implicit in the structure and logic of written constitutionalism, and in the nature of the governmental arrangements that our Constitution creates, is a corollary rule of construction about what to do when textual meaning runs out: when
exegesis of the text does not supply a rule of law, the logic of the
governmental structure created by the Constitution indicates
that the democratic, republican institutions vested with legislative and executive power concerning such matters get to do the
"constructing," within the range of any construction zones afforded
by a partially indeterminate text. The structure of the Constitution-its separation, division, and limitation of powers among
the three branches of the national government and the nature of
the republican government it creates-strongly supports this
hermeneutic principle. (So do limitations on the nature of judicial power, and limitations implicit in the structural-textual
argument for judicial review, as I discuss next.)
101 Id (emphasis added). One can probably infer-without going all the way down
the road to an unwritten constitution-that this applies to federal judges as well as state
judges.
102 US Const Art VI, cl 3.
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This second hermeneutic principle of written constitutionalism is linked to the specific structure and nature of the US
Constitution. While a written constitution might choose to vest
all interpretive power, or power to fill in all uncertainties, in a
specific body or actor (like a "constitutional court"), our system
of separation of powers does not assign plenary interpretive
power-or "construction" power-to any one branch but leaves
the power to interpret and apply the Constitution to the respective powers of multiple actors, with none granted supremacy
over the others.103 A construction zone is simply not, under the
political theory of the American Constitution, a grant of judicial
lawmaking power.
This would seem to furnish the proper basis for the intuition
that a "presumption of constitutionality" should attach to the
considered actions of Congress and the president.104 The principle
is sometimes stated in such a way as to imply (incorrectly) that
this is merely a judicially devised rule of restraint extrinsic to
the constitutional text, rather than a rule fairly discerned from
the text itself. Strictly speaking, however, it is not that there is
literally a presumption of correctness attached to another
branch's actions or some vaguely neo-Thayerian principle of judicial "deference" to the political branches' choices.105 Rather, it
is simply that, as a matter of correct interpretation of the text,
the proper hermeneutic principle is that indeterminacy does not
warrant judicial invalidation of legislative or executive actions
that fall within the range of meaning of the specific text at issue.1 6
1o3 As famously expressed by James Madison, "The several departments being perfectly co-ordinate by the terms of their common commission, neither of them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between
their respective powers." Federalist 49 (Madison), in The Federalist338, 339 (cited in
note 1). For a detailed explication of this position, see generally Paulsen, 83 Georgetown
L J 217 (cited in note 1).
104 See, for example, Walters v National Association of Radiation Survivors, 468 US
1323, 1324 (1984).
105 See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv L Rev 129, 144 (1893). In earlier writing I have objected to use of
the term "deference" if it refers to a decision contrary to one's settled conviction as to the
right answer to a legal question on account of the contrary position of another constitutional actor. See Paulsen, 83 Georgetown L J at 336 n 413 (cited in note 1) ("I emphatically reject the view, which sometimes travels under the name of deference, that an interpreter (typically, a judge) should reach a conclusion different from the one produced
by her best legal analysis, or should refrain from reaching any conclusion at all, because
of the views of another.").
106 See Paulsen, 103 Nw U L Rev at 882 (cited in note 1) ("Unspecific texts do not
warrant abstracting more specific principles. The Constitution's structure suggests the
opposite rule: Unspecific texts, to the extent of their un-specificity, permit a range of
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Third, and relatedly, the argument for what is commonly
called "judicial review"-the power of courts to refuse to give effect to unconstitutional actions of political actors-is itself premised on a rule of construction: that where the Constitution supplies a rule of law, and the political branches or states have
acted contrary to that rule, the courts must give effect to the
Constitution's rule and not the contrary action.107 This principle
likewise suggests its own corollary rule limiting the power of judicial review: where it cannot be said that the actions of the political branches are contrary to a rule of law supplied by exegesis
of the text-whether because the text does not speak to the
point, because exegesis of the text reveals a range of answers
none of which can be privileged over the others, or because the
text is vague, ambiguous, or otherwise indeterminate-then the
actions of the political branches must stand. Again, this is not
because of some principle of deference to democratic institutions,
imported from outside the text. It is because such a principle is,
in general, a sound inference from the text itself-from specific
provisions and from overall structure. The power of judicial review
derives from a rule of construction about the effect of determinate

legitimate interpretation and application by political decisionmakers."); Paulsen, 31
Harv J L & Pub Pol at 994 (cited in note 18) ("Vhere a constitutional provision has a legitimate range of meaning-where there is ambiguity or open-endedness-and the legislature has acted pursuant to a view fairly within that range, a court may not properly invalidate what the legislature has done.").
There may need to be specific sub-rules of construction to deal with separation of
powers disputes and federalism disputes-when the question is which democratic political
institution gets to do the construing and constructing. See, for example, Gary Lawson,
Dead Document Walking, 92 BU L Rev 1225, 1233-35 (2012) (proposing several, debatable,
such rules of construction with respect to enumerated powers and state-versus-national
authority); Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19 Harv J L & Pub
Pol 411, 421-28 (1996). See also Morrison v Olson, 487 US 654, 704 (1988) (Scalia dissenting) (noting that the Court's usual "presumption of constitutionality" accorded an act
of Congress "does not apply" in a separation of powers dispute between Congress and the
president over whether Congress's enactment is constitutional) (emphasis omitted). In
each case, whether a specific sub-rule of construction is justified is itself properly a question of interpretation of the Constitution's text and structure-and not a matter of rules
imported from extrinsic sources or devised as a matter of policy. It goes without saying
that the correct content of such sub-rules is often fairly debatable as a matter of original
textual meaning. See, for example, Paulsen, 31 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 992, 1003 (cited in
note 18) (arguing, contra Lawson, that the better structural inference from the text, as
concerns allowable congressional construction of the scope of enumerated federal legislative powers, falls more along Hamiltonian rather than Jeffersonian lines: that broadly
worded powers should be accorded the full sweep of their language).
107 That rule is brilliantly and clearly set forth and defended in Federalist78 (Hamilton),
in The Federalist521 (cited in note 1) and Marbury v Madison, 5 US 137 (1803). See also
generally Paulsen, 101 Mich L Rev 2706 (cited in note 1).

1438

The University of Chicago Law Review

[81:1385

constitutional language for judicial obligation: courts must invalidate political actions contrary to a rule of law supplied by the
text. The limitations on the power of judicial review derive from
the same rule of construction: courts must not invalidate political
actions unless contrary to a rule of law supplied by the text.
All of this suggests a fourth, more general constitutional
rule of constitutional construction: rules of construction for
applying the Constitution need to be rules warranted by and
consistent with the text of the Constitution. And how does one
tell if a rule of construction is truly justified by the text? I offer
here a rule of thumb, but a useful one that I believe supported
by the Constitution and by written constitutionalism generally:
the more closely a particular rule of construction can be tied to
the text, structure, and historical evidence of original intention
of the Constitution, the more legitimate and reliable it is likely
to be. The looser such fit, the less legitimate and proper the rule
of construction. Alas, it is fair to say that the latter describes a
good many of Amar's construction projects: the "Lived Constitution" (p 95), "'Warrented' Constitution" (p 139), "Doctrinal Constitution" (p 201), "Symbolic Constitution" (p 243), and "Feminist Constitution" (p 277), are creative hermeneutic paradigms.
But they are only very loosely connected to the text, and sometimes several steps removed from it.
A fifth hermeneutic principle follows from the idea that
rules-of-construction principles need to be closely tied to the
text: the traditional canon disfavoring textual readings that
produce absurd results is one that needs to be closely guarded
and tightly limited. Indeed, one should almost prefer occasional
textual absurdity to the slippery slope of unwritten-ism. Here's
the argument: The idea of written constitutionalism, as noted, in
principle leans against the project of construction, and all the
more heavily so the more a construction seems to counsel
against applying the plain, natural, or better sense of the text's
original linguistic meaning. 108 The text ought not to be construed
to be "the best constitution it could be" if the text is actually not
the best constitution that could be.109 Policy-driven rules of construction are the least likely to be legitimate, the least likely to
be fairly derived from attempts at faithful exegesis of the written
text rather than from the construers' preferences. Similarly, a de108 See Part III.
109 For an argument that interpretation ought to make what it interprets the best it

can be, see Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 62 (Belknap 1986).
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sire to make the text "work," in the sense of being conformable to
modern preferences and sensibilities or conformable to modern
practice, is not a textually supportable rule of construction.110
The "absurdity" canon is tricky, and potentially dangerous,
precisely because it falls midway between accepted historical
principles for ascertaining original textual meaning-it is an
attempt accurately to capture textual meaning by recognizing
that literalism might not, in some applications, reflect the text's
true sense-and policy-driven construction to reach better, preferred results. One should lean against any argument that an
outcome is "absurd" simply because it is unexpected, unfamiliar,
or even (seemingly) undesirable from a modern policy perspective.
One should perhaps even tolerate a degree of seeming absurdity
for the sake of safeguarding the general principle of fidelity to
actual textual meaning. If the written Constitution, interpreted
in accordance with its original linguistic meaning, sometimes
produces "bad" results, unintended outcomes, even arguably
"absurd" consequences, those effects are made identifiable by
faithful textual exegesis and are remediable by correcting the
written text. There is thus a textual remedy for the disease of
textual inadequacy or absurdity. If, however, any such defects
can be deemed whisked away by magical unwritten principles,
one can never know what really needs correcting in the first
place-the text may mean what it says, and it may not-and one
can never know quite where the unwritten "correction" will go
and whether it was correct or not."'
110 Of course, it may well be that a constitutional provision bears a sufficiently
broad range of meaning that different practices at different times are consistent with a
text whose rule is an elastic or general one. But that is a different thing entirely. In such
an instance, one is not construing text to make it conform to practice; one is noting that
practice conforms to the text, faithfully interpreted to permit a range of choices.
111 Amar's book begins with the construe-to-avoid-absurdity canon-a good rhetorical strategy if one is attempting to build a case for expansive construction zones. And in
building his argument in favor of the anti-absurdity rule, he chooses an illustration in
which I am the Absurdity Villain. (This may also be a good strategy.) In a two-page, halfin-jest law review article that I wrote some years ago, Paulsen 14 Const Commen at 245
(cited in note 56), I argued that the textually best reading of the Constitution is that the
vice president of the United States is the presiding officer over his own impeachment
trial, a truly stupid mistake made by the drafters of the Constitution but nonetheless
(unless and until fixed) the legally "correct" answer as a matter of constitutional interpretation as the text now stands. Chapter One of Amar's book is devoted to an elaborate
refutation of this position (pp 3-22). Amar's analysis in that opening chapter is the
springboard for his general thesis that we often should not read the Constitution to
mean what it says. (Therefore, in a way, I feel guiltily responsible for Amar's project: it
was launched in part to slay my mirthful embrace of a seemingly absurd result.)
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Might I therefore (as humbly as doing so will permit) suggest a friendly refinement to Blackstone? The absurdity canon of
construction is properly limited to instances in which its application can be said to facilitate accurate textual interpretation of
a legal document in accordance with the true, original public
meaning of the language employed-that is, the objective meaning the words would have had, in historical, linguistic, and political context, to a reasonable, informed speaker and reader of the
English language at the time that they were adopted. It is not
properly employed to displace the original, objective public
meaning of the text with even a demonstrably far more sensible
rendering in the eyes of the interpreter-construer.
Sixth, and finally, specific provisions of the Constitution
ought to be understood in light of, and within the context of, the
Constitution as a whole. They should be construed, when possible, in light of the overarching purpose of preserving America's
constitutional government and the success of the overall constitutional enterprise. This may mean-as President Lincoln
thought it did-that the Constitution is properly and fairly read
as embodying an internal meta-rule of construction strongly favoring national preservation and avoidance of truly cataclysmic
consequences. In Lincoln's view, the president's duty to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution entails a correlative
duty to preserve, protect, and defend the nation whose constitution it is; just as "a life is never wisely given to save a limb," the
enterprise of American constitutional government as a whole
ought not be sacrificed for a reading of a particular part. 112 This
is a rule of construction, to be sure. It pushes the envelope of the
text about as far as it can go. (It has some similarities to the
absurdity canon in this respect.) But it remains a rule of construction that, like the others, derives its content-and whatever
For my part, I am inclined to accept the (relatively few) truly absurd results that follow from faithful reading and application of the Constitution's text, even if it means that
the vice president presides over his own impeachment trial. Such errors are readily correctable by constitutional amendment. The acknowledgement that the Constitution contains errors is far more palatable than abandoning the project of written constitutionalism entirely in favor of ingenious rules of construction, invented doctrines, and judicial
manipulation that produce results like Dred Scott, Plessy, Lochner, and Roe. Give me a
scoundrel vice president-we've endured several already (Burr, Johnson, Agnew, Gore,
and others)-over Amar's unwritten constitution any day.
112 Lincoln, To Albert G. Hodges, in Fehrenbacher, ed, Abraham Lincoln: Speeches
and Writings 585, 585 (cited in note 32). I have embraced this view, and Lincoln's brilliant defense of it, in other writing. See Paulsen, 79 Notre Dame L Rev at 1263-67,
1282-89 (cited in note 15).
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legitimacy it has-from a reading of the text, the whole text, and
the logical and structural inferences that fairly can be derived
from the text. It does not come from extrinsic principles separate
from the text's original and objective meaning.
CONCLUSION

I have been hard on my old friend, Akhil Amar-perhaps too
hard. There is much terrific material in America's Unwritten
Constitution: much to ponder, debate, and consider. As food for
thought, it is a feast.
But as medicine for what ails written constitutionalism, it
cannot be taken without disastrous effects. Much of it is unnecessary and unhelpful medicine: the written Constitution does
the desired work better than Amar's thesis of an implicit unwritten
constitution. And much of it is improper medicine: Amar's unwritten constitution in important, unpredictable, and unprincipled
ways supersedes entirely, and tends to destroy, the enterprise of
written constitutionalism. The prescription kills the patient.
And that is the huge flaw of this hugely ambitious project.
Amar's diagnosis of the flaws of written textualism is considerably
overblown. Original-meaning textualism allows for some troubling
results, presents certain issues, and creates some headaches.
But Amar's cure is worse than the disease, by far. Free-floating,
untethered-from-text unwritten constitutionalism prescribes the
guillotine as a remedy for a headache.
America's Unwritten Constitution is the most important,
dangerously wrongheaded academic book about the Constitution
written in many years. It is important because it comes from the
pen of Akhil Amar, one of the nation's most important constitutional scholars and the author of one of the best, most definitive
treatments of the written Constitution ever (America's Constitution: A Biography), along with a host of other excellent books
and articles. And it is dangerous for much the same reason. Amar's
status and skills give this book the capacity to deceive and mislead many. It is therefore important-vital, even-that the oftendreadful ideas that the book advances, and the dreadful theme
of unwritten constitutionalism that it embraces, be confronted
directly and repudiated emphatically.

